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TIME OUT: THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND FIDUCIARY THEORY
IN PSYCHOTHERAPIST SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT CASES
LINDA JORGENSON* & REBECCA M. RANDL-ES**
Since 1975, sexual abuse of patients by psychotherapists has become an
area of growing concern.' The damage precipitated by sexual contact between
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1. In 1975, Masters and Johnson vehemently denounced sexual contact between therapist
and patient. It was their belief that such contact constitutes rape. See Masters & Johnson,
Principles of the New Sex Therapy, 131 Am. J. Psycm.ATRY 548 (1976). For a discussion, see
infra note 81 and accompanying text.
Since the late 1970s, a number of nationwide surveys have been conducted to determine the
prevalence and effects on patients of sexual contact in the therapeutic relationship. See Holroyd
& Brodsky, Psychologists' Attitudes & Practices Regarding Erotic & Nonerotic Physical Contact
with Patients, 32 AM. PSYCHoLoGisT 843 (1977) [hereinafter Holroyd & Brodsky, Psychologists'
Attitudes]; Pope, Levenson & Schover, Sexual Intimacy in Psychology Training: Results &
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psychotherapists and their patients causes long-term harm which may be
slow to manifest itself and difficult for the injured party to trace. 2 As a
Implications of a National Survey, 34 AM. PscHorLoxs 682, 682-89 (1979) [hereinafter, Pope,
Sexual Intimacy in Psychology Training]; Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein & Localio, Psy-
chiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National Survey, L Prevalence, 143 AM. J. Psy-
CEmATRY 1126, 1131 (1986) [hereinafter Gartrell, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact] (this study
surveyed one-fifth of all psychiatrists under the age of 65; while the return rate was low (only
26%), the profile of the respondents was consistent with the profile of the professional population
in the American Mo:lird Association master file except that a significantly larger proportion of
board certified psycholc.gists answered the survey). See also Gechtman, Sexual Contact Between
Social Workers & Their Clients, in SEXUAL EXPLOrrATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATiONSHPs 27 (G.
Gabbard ed. 1989).
State legislatures have enacted both civil and criminal statutes to address the issue of psycho-
therapist sexual misconduct. Minnesota has been at the forefront of this issue. In 1984 the
Minnesota legislature appointed a task force to study the problem of sexual exploitation by
counselors and therapists. See MiNN. STAT. § 631 (1984). The task force produced three publi-
cations - a brochure, a pamphlet, and a book. All three are titled It's Never O.K. See MimN.
PuB. EDUC. WORK GROUP OF THE TAsK FORCE ON SEXUAL EXPOIrrATION BY CoUNsELORS &
THERaP , IT's NEvan O.K.: A HANDBOOK FOR VicS & Vicnms ADVOCATES ON SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION BY CouNrmE:oRs & THERAPIsrs (1988) [hereinafter MINN. TAsK FORCE, IT's NnvER
O.K.: HANDBOOK FOit Vrcms]; Tas STATE TAsK FORCE ON SEXUAL EXPLOrrATION BY COUNSELORS
& THER"isrs, IT'S NEvER O.K.: A HANDBOOK FOR PROFES IONALs ON SEXUAL ExPLOrrAmON BY
CouNsELoRs & TmEAPLrrs (B. Sanderson ed. 1989) [hereinafter Mmi. TAsK FORCE, IT's NEvEm
O.K.: PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK].
- Gary Schoener, director of the Minnesota Walk-In Counseling Center, and his colleagues have
written an extremely comprehensive book on this topic which is invaluable in detailing the clinical
and ethical issues involved in psychotherapist sexual abuse of clients. See G. ScHOENER, J.
MiLOROM, J. GoNsioRm, E. LuEPmE & R. CONROE, PsYcHOTHEiAPISrs' SEXUAL INvoLvEmmNT
wrrH CLIENTS: N EV=NO & PREVENTION (1989) [hereinafter G. ScnoENER, PsYcHoTH rs'
SEXUAL INVOLVEMEN WIH CLIENTS].
Several states have ptssed legislation making psychotherapist-patient sexual contact a criminal
offense. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 729 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-3-405.5
(4Xc) (Supp. 1988); 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 90-70, § 1(4)(a) (West); ME. Rav. STAT. tit.
17-A § 253 (2)(1) (Supp. 1989); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341 to 609.351 (Supp. 1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE 12.1-20-06.1 (1) (Michie Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (2) (West 1985).
Pennsylvania has a bill pending concerning sexual exploitation, while Massachusetts is in the task
force process. See H.R. 151, 1989 Sess. (Pa. 1989); H.R. 976, 2d Sess., 176 Gen. Court (Mass.
1989).
Four states have created a civil cause of action. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 43.93 (West
Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 801 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
148A (West 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.70 (2) (West 1988).
All of the major mental health organizations prohibit sexual contact between therapist and
patient. See infra note 6.
For a complete discussion of the new statutory enactments, see Jorgenson, Randles & Stras-
burger, Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 645 (1991) [hereinafter Jorgenson, Randles, & Strasburger, Patient-Psychotherapist
Sex].
2. These consequences have been discussed in two cases. In Simmons v. United States, the
court of appeals found legally sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that the
plaintiff did not know that the defendant's conduct caused her emotional injury until 1983 -
more than three years after the sexual contact had occurred. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d
1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 198 6).
In Greenberg v. McCabe, the court found the plaintiff's delayed discovery of her cause of
[Vol. 44:181
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result of the unique characteristics of the injuries caused by sexual contact
in a psychotherapeutic relationship, many victims are unable to prosecute
claims within the period allowed by most statutes of limitations.
3
This article explores fiduciary theory as the basis for tolling the statute
of limitations in psychotherapist sexual misconduct cases. The article first
discusses the circumstances leading to psychotherapist sexual abuse and
victims' resulting inability to advance their claims within the statutory period
otherwise imposed. A discussion follows as to why fiduciary theory provides
a particularly appropriate model for the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
The article then argues that fiduciary theory as applied to the psychother-
apist-patient relationship justifies tolling the statute of limitations in these
cases, through the application of either the discovery rule or the fraudulent
concealment doctrine. Finally, the authors discuss the policy considerations
involved in extending or tolling the statute of limitations.
I. The Damage Inflicted by Abusive Therapists
The injuries sustained by victims of sexual exploitation in the therapeutic
relationship are wide-ranging and long-term.4 It is the abuse that occurs in
action explainable for three reasons: (1) dependence on her therapist impeded her ability to
understand the relationship between the treatment she received and the damages she suffered; (2)
the therapist assured her that the treatment was proper; and (3) the plaintiff could not reasonably
be expected to independently investigate while still in therapy. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F.
Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
Commentators also recognize inappropriate treatment may cause long-term continuing harm.
See G. Scnomqza, PsYcHoTHERAmss' Sxu.L IxvoLvEENT wrTH Cusm, supra note 1, at 76-
77 (victims may experience developmental fixation and continuing harm); Pope, How Clients Are
Harmed by Sexual Contact with Mental Health Care Professionals: The Syndrome and Its
Prevalence, 67 J. CouNsEuao & Dav. 222 (1988) [hereinafter Pope, How Clients Are Harmed
by Sexual Contact] (discussion of commonly occurring damages and long-term effects associated
with sexual contact by psychotherapists).
Pope further discussed instances in which the damage may be slow to manifest. He stated:
The sequelae (for the court) of therapist-client [sexual contact] may form a distinct
clinical syndrome, which is similar in some ways to Rape Response Syndrome,
Battered Spouse Syndrome, reaction to Incest, response to Child Abuse and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Like many of these syndromes the appearance of the
damage may be considerably delayed.
Id. at 224.
For further discussion of these ideas, see infra notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
3. Many states have statutes of limitations ranging from two to four years. See, e.g., MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West 1980) (three years for actions of tort and personal injury);
Thx. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, § 10.01 (Vernon 1979) (two years from occurrence of
breach). However, victims may be unable to come forward for many years following the sexual
misconduct. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986); Greenberg v.
McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 840 (1979). For further discussion of this proposition, see infra notes 26-45 and
accompanying text.
4. See Pope, Research & Laws Regarding Therapist-Patient Sexual Involvement: Implications
for Therapists, 40(4) AM. J. PsYcHnoTHEAPY 564 (1986) [hereinafter Pope, Research & Laws
Regarding Therapist-Patient Sex] (lists profound depression, inability to maintain employment,
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the context of the special relationship between the therapist and the client
that causes the harms suffered by victims of therapist exploitation.' This
section will examine the prevalence of sexual abuse, the characteristics of
the victims, the injuries which are often caused by the abuse and how the
psychotherapist's special relationship with the patient can give rise to abuse.
A. Prevalence Of Abuse
Every major mental health care organization denounces sexual contact in
psychotherapeutic relationships. 6 Despite these admonishments, a significant
number of therapists still engage in sexual or sexualized conduct with their
patients. 7 Recent self-reporting surveys reveal that 7-12% of psychotherapists
have engaged in sexual relations with at least one client.8 Professionals in
the field believe the figure may be as high as 20%. 9 One study finds that
80% of those reporting any sexual involvement become sexually intimate
with more than one patient. 0 A researcher reports that of the psychiatrists
she surveyed, 65% have counseled at least one patient who had been sexually
abused by a prior therapist." These statistics indicate that large numbers of
anxiety, suicide attempts, suicide, and the need for hospitalizations and shock treatments among
damages suffered by victims); G. ScHOENER, PsYcHoTHmRAPIsTs' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH
CLUENTs, supra note I, at 65-79 (discussion of sexual involvement between therapists and clients
as form of abuse, and comparing it to incest).
5. When a psychotherapist becomes sexually involved with a patient, the patient loses the
psychotherapist as a caretaker, gaining instead a lover. But when an adult seeks professional help
for an emotional hurt, that person is placed in a childlike posture of dependence. The patient
must place trust in the caretaker in order to effect a cure. "Regression in the service of cure"
may stimulate latent conflicts within the patient and harm the patient's emotional well-being.
Kardener, Sex & the Physician Patient Relationship, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1135 (1974)
[hereinafter Kardener, Sex & the Physician Patient Relationship]. See also R. SimoN, CUNmCAL
PsYCmA-RY & TE I.Avl 289 (1986); G. SCHOENER, PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT
wrns CuaNts, supra note 1, at 65-79.
6. See AM. PsYcmAATRc Ass'N, Principles of Medical Ethics & Annotations Especially
Applicable to Psychiatry (1985); AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N, Principles of Ethics for Psychoa-
nalysis & Provisions for Implementation of the Principles of Ethics for Psychoanalysis (1983);
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL AS'N, Ethical Principles of Psychologists (1980); NAT'L Ass'N OF SOCIAL
WoRKERs, INC., Cod? of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers (1980).
7. For a complete review of the literature, see G. ScHOENER, PSYCHOmaRAPISTS' SEXUAL
INVOLVEMENT wrH CuErs, supra note 1; Moison, Sins of the Secular Priesthood: Civil Liability
for the Sexual Seduction of Patients, 33 MED. Tnmi TECH. Q. 441 (1986-87) [hereinafter Moison,
Sins of the Secular Priesthood] (discussion of injuries commonly manifested in victims of sexual
abuse). For further discussion, see infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
8. See Gartrell, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact, supra note 1, at 1128 (reporting 7.1%
of all male psychiatrists and 3.1% of female psychiatrists have engaged in sexual contact); Pope,
Sexual Intimacy in Puychology Training, supra note 1, at 682 (12% of male therapists admitted
sexual contact and 3% of female therapists had engaged in sexual contact).
9. See Pope, Research & Laws Regarding Therapist-Patient Sex, supra note 4, at 565
(reporting insurance industry data that 20% will engage in sexual abuse at some time in career);
Moison, Sins of the Sectular Priesthood, supra note 7, at 444.
10. Holroyd & Brodeky, Psychologists' Attitudes, supra note I, at 848-49.
11. Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein & Localio, Reporting Practices of Psychiatrists Who
[Vol. 44:181
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psychotherapy patients become victims of sexual abuse. 12 The Minnesota
Walk-In Counseling Center reports counseling over 1500 victims within the
last ten years alone." Sexual involvement with patients is the leading source
of litigation against psychologists insured under the American Psychological
Association's policy.
14
B. Characteristics of the Victims
Victims vary widely in socioeconomic status, diagnosis, and level of
functioning." Both men and women may be victimized by their therapists,
although most victims are female, attractive, and younger than their ther-
apists.' 6 Regardless of the victim's profile, research shows that sexual contact
with one's therapist can be very harmful.
7
Knew of Sexual Misconduct By Colleagues, 57 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCmATRY 287, 289 (1987)
[hereinafter Gartrell, Reporting Practices].
12. Moison, Sins of the Secular Priesthood, supra note 7, at 443 (sex-related charges rank
eighth among causes of malpractice actions against psychiatrists).
13. See G. ScHoENEI, PsYcHoTmERAPIss' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT wTH CLIEN's, supra note
I, at iii. In a recent newspaper article, Gary Schoener, director of the Minnesota Walk-In
Counseling Center estimated that "we have looked at in excess of 2000 cases in the last fifteen
years." Taylor, When Seeking Help Brings Additional Grief, Toronto Globe & Mail, Oct. 8,
1990, at Al.
14. See G. ScHomim, PSYCHOTRAPIS' SEXUAL INVOLvEmENT wrr CLIENMs, supra note
1, at 538. From 1976 to 1986, sexual intimacy with clients was the most frequent cause of suits
against psychologists insured under the American Psychological Association's policy. Suits ac-
counted for 44.8% of all monies - $7,018,165 - paid in response to claims. Id.
15. See Robertiello, latrogenic Psychiatric Illness, 7 J. CowrEm. PsYcHoTHERAPY 6 (1975),
cited in K. PoPE & J. BoUHoursos, SExuAL IurAmcY BErwEEN THERAmss & PATNmes 47-48
(1986).
16. See K. PoPE & J. BouHouTsos, supra note 15, at 46-56; Gartrell, Psychiatrist-Patient
Sexual Contact, supra note 1, at 1128 (88% of contacts for which gender specified occurred
between male psychiatrists and female patients; patients ranged from age 20 to 48); Marmor,
Some Psychodynamic Aspects of the Seduction of Patients, 36 AM. J. PsYcHoANALYsIS 319, 320
(1976) ("[i]t is noteworthy that most erotic breaches of the therapist-patient relationship occur
with women who are physically attractive, almost never with the aged, the infirm or the ugly,
thus giving the lie to the oft-heard rationalization on the part of such therapists that they were
acting in the interest of the patient"). See also G. ScHoENER, PSYCHOTHERAIS' SEXUAL
INVOLvEMENT wrrH CuauErs, supra note 1, at 95 (most of the 1500 victims that have been treated
by Minnesota Walk-In Counseling Center are women; over 80% exploited by male therapists).
17. Several studies have been conducted which quantify the prevalence of abuse and the type
and severity of damage to victims of psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation. See, e.g.,
Kardener, Fuller & Mensh, A Survey of Physicians' Attitudes and Practices Regarding Erotic
and Nonerotic Contact with Patients, 130 AM. J. PSYCmATRY 1077 (1973) [hereinafter Kardener,
Fuller & Mensh, A Survey of Physicians' Attitudes]; Holroyd & Brodsky, Psychologist's Attitudes,
supra note 1; Pope, Sexual Intimacy in Psychology Training, supra note 1; Bouhoutsos, Holroyd,
Lerman, Forer & Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PRoF.
PsYcIATRY 185 (1983) [hereinafter Bouhoutsos, Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists &
Patients]; Pope, Tabachnik & Keith-Spiegel, Sexual Attraction to Clients: The Human Therapist
and the (Sometimes) Inhuman Training System, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGST 147, 151 (1986) [hereinafter,
Pope, Tabachnik & Keith-Spiegel, Sexual Attraction to Clients]; Gartrell, Psychiatrist-Patient
Sexual Contact, supra note 1; Gechtman, Sexual Contact Between Social Workers & Their Clients,
supra note 1, at 27-38.
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C. Damage Caused by the Sexualization of Therapy
1. Mental and Emotional Dysfunction
Studies indicate that up to 90% of the patients who have engaged in
sexual contact with their psychotherapists were harmed as a result.' 8 The
damage suffered by these victims is often extensive. 9 The patient's presenting
illness may be reactivated or aggravated. 20 In addition, the exploitation
sometimes creates new psychopathology, such as post-traumatic stress dis-
order, not present prior to the client's commencement of therapy. 2'
Injuries suffered by victims of psychotherapist sexual exploitation include
sexual dysfunction, anxiety disorders, psychiatric hospitalizations, increased
risk of suicide, depression, dissociative behavior, internalization of feelings
of guilt, shame, anger, fear, confusion, and hatred, and feelings of worth-
lessness. 22 Inability to trust others is perhaps the most damaging and prev-
alent injury suffered by victims.23 Because victims become wary of other
psychotherapists, abuse renders subsequent treatment very difficult and of
little value,2 or causes a patient to avoid further therapy altogether.2Y The
18. Gartrell, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact, supra note 1, at 1126 (respondents indicated
that 87% of patients suffered ill effects from sexual involvement with their psychotherapists).
19. For a discussion, see G. SCHOENER, PsYcHORAms'' SExuAL INvOLvm NT wrrH
CLmNrs, supra note 1, at 103-12 (describing common client experiences); see infra notes 20-45
and accompanying text.
20. See Apfel & Simon, Patient-Therapist Sexual Contact: L Psychodynamic Perspectives on
the Causes & Results, 43 PSYCHOSOmATIC PSYCHoTHERAPY 57, 60 [hereinafter Apfel & Simon,
Patient-Therapist Sexual Contact] (original symptoms, including sexual dysfunction that brought
patient to therapy may persist or worsen).
21. See MINN. TASx FORCE, IT'S NEvER O.K.: PROFEMssONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 35
(injuries include confusion, guilt, shame, sense of loss, and new psychological problems); Pope,
How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact, supra note 2, at 224-25 (therapist-patient sexual
contact may cause distinct clinical syndrome in which damage is considerably delayed); G.
SCHOENER, PsYCHornEAPiss' SaxuAL INVOLVEMENT WinH CLUINTS, supra note 1, at 145 (dis-
cussing types of damages a psychotherapist might expect following an exploitative relationship
including post-traumatic stress disorder).
22. See, e.g., Pope, Research & Laws Regarding Therapist-Patient Sex, supra note 4, at 567;
Pope, How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact, supra note 2 (delineates syndrome with
symptoms including guilt; denial; isolation; feelings of emptiness; sexual confusion; impaired
ability to trust; identity, boundary and role confusion; repressed rage; increased suicide risk; and
cognitive dysfunction); Collins, Mebed & Mortimer, Patient-Therapist Sex: Consequences for
Subsequent Treatment, 3 MclEAN Hosp. J. 24 (1978) [hereinafter Collins, Consequences for
Subsequent Treatment] (documents injuries including depression, anxiety, psychiatric hospitali-
zations); Pope, Therapist-Patient Sex Syndrome: A Guide for Attorneys, in SExUAL EXPLorrATON
IN PRoFEss oNAL RELATiONsHIPS 45 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989) [hereinafter Pope, Therapist-Patient
Sex Syndrome] (ambivalence, guilt, emptiness and isolation, sexual confusion, impaired ability to
trust, identity problems and role reversal, emotional lability or dyscontrol, increased risk of
suicide, cognitive dysfunction).
23. See infra notes 52-93 and accompanying text.
24. See Collins, Conequences for Subsequent Treatment, supra note 22 (studying dynamics
of subsequent therapy, finding limited success).
25. See Apfel & Simon, Patient-Therapist Sexual Contact, supra note 20, at 58 (describes
ambivalence toward therapists and therapy expressed through difficulty finding therapist, frequent
changes of therapist, delays, and avoiding seeking needed therapy).
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key needed by patients to learn of the consequences of their abuse is taken
from them by the very misconduct.
2. Inability to Enforce Legal Rights
Victims of sexual exploitation often are unable to enforce their legal rights
within the statutory time limit.2 Occasionally a client may repress the
traumatic events from conscious memory.27 More commonly, victims are
unable to connect their abuse experience with their subsequent psychological
injuries. 28 The injuries suffered by the victims of therapist negligence are to
the personality and mind.29 Clients sometimes attribute the symptoms ex-
perienced - such as emotional instability, depression, and guilt - to
personal inadequacies, rather than to the therapist's abuse of the relation-
ship.10 In addition, mental injury frequently manifests itself in incongruous
ways. 31 For example, panic attacks, sleeplessness, and inability to concentrate
26. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (inability to recognize cause
of injury until statute of limitations had already run); Gabbard, Introduction, in SExuAL Ex-
PLorrATioN i PROFESSIONAREL&TioNsmPS xi (G. Gabbard ed. .1989) [hereinafter Gabbard,
Introduction]; MwN. TAsK FORCE, IT'S NEvE O.K.: PROFESsiONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at
15-17.
27. See Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1990); Mary
Doe v. John Doe, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 254 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1989); Meiers-Post v. Schafer,
170 Mich. App. 174, 427 N.W.2d 606 (1988). It should be noted that as of this date, no cases
have been reported concerning psychotherapy patients having lost all memory of the abuse.
However, practitioners report having treated victims who did repress all memory of the event.
G. ScHomNE,, PsYcHoTmmnPSr' SEXUAL INvoLvE MENT wrrH CLImN, supra note 1, at 142
(describing atypical dissociative behavior); see also infra notes 269-73, 293 and accompanying
text.
28. For a discussion, see TAsK FORCE oN SExuAL EXPLorrATIoN BY CouNsELoRs & TEAPisTs,
MINN. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, REPORT TO THE MINNEsOTA LEorsi.u 12 (1985); CAL. SENATE
RuLas Comms., REPORT OF THm SENATE TAsK FORCE ON PsYcnoTHA P & PATIENTS SEXUAL
RELATIONS 12 (1987).
29. See Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1989) (plaintiff alleged emotional
injury suffered as a result of improper and physically abusive psychological training course; court
denied summary judgment on grounds that psychological injury is not sufficient in itself to put
reasonable person on notice of legal injury); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780,
786 (1991) (discussing how injury to the mind may interfere with discovery of cause of action);
see also Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Counsel, 853 F.2d 948, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(evidence of "thought reform" caused by psychological training may be admitted as evidence to
establish why plaintiff failed to detect mental injury).
30. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case, the
plaintiff testified that she believed the conduct occurred because "she was a very bad person, a
worthless person, a guilty person." Id. at 1367. Her expert witness explained that she began to
think of herself as "a sexually bad person, someone who was sexually dirty or degraded or
whorish." Id.
31. See Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1989). In this case, the plaintiff
alleged she began suffering psychological decompensation, severe and continuing depression, and
mood swings. The court held
the fact that an individual develops psychological problems, even severe ones, is
not sufficient in itself to put a reasonable person on notice that they have been
injured. Far too many persons undergo serious psychological suffering without
legally compensable injury to make it a reasonable expectation on the part of the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
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- all symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 2 - do not intuitively
flow from the act of sexual intercourse or other sexualized behavior. Most
clients need professional assistance to understand the results of sexual
exploitation.
3
Yet the act of exploitation causes most victims to remain distrustful of
other psychotherapists. 34 This situation renders many victims incapable of
discerning the cause of their injury until their remedy is time-barred. 3 Like
victims of incest, victims of abuse by their therapists are often unable to
come forward for many years.
36
In Greenberg v. McCabe7 the plaintiff was unable to pursue her cause
of action for several years. In this case, an osteopath undertook psychiatric
counseling of the plaintiff.38 During the course of treatment, the plaintiff
became so dependent on her therapist that he became god-like to her.
Because of her dependence on him, she did not question his therapy
techniques or the sexual relationship that he began with her. 39 She finally
discovered her legal rights against him, but it was more than three years
after the therapy and the relationship ended. The statute of limitations had
run.40
courts that the emergence of a psychological problem should be evaluated imme-
diately in terms of injury.
Id. at 18. See also Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780 (1991). In Riley, the plaintiff
alleged he began suffering severe psychological and emotional problems after exploitative therapy
which involved marijuana, alcohol and valium use as well as sexual intimacy, but could not link
his therapy to his injury for several years. The court held that, while the evidence on record did
not require a ruling that Riley's action was timely, "a reasonable fact-finder could find that
Riley did not make the causal link and that his failure to do so was reasonable. Thus, summary
judgment should not have been granted." Id. at 786.
32. For a description of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, see AM. Psycmrsiuc Ass'N, DtAo-
NOSTIC AND STATSTcAL MANUAL oF ME'TAL Disowmns (3d ed. 1978).
33. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986).
34. Pope, How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact, supra note 2, at 225 ("[v]ictims
become mistrustful .... [of] themselves for developing a trust for the therapist .... [and of]
others, particularly professionals, most particularly therapists").
35. See, e.g., Seymour v. Lofgren, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 (1972) (dismissal of suit upheld
as time-barred on groumd that plaintiff knew fact and cause of injury when she began new course
of treatment); Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A.2d 389 (1980) (plaintiff's action barred
as court held that plaintiff reasonably should have known sexual relationship with therapist
injured her prior to running of the limitations period); Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.
1988) (claim barred by tile statute of limitations despite transference phenomenon).
36. See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 366-67 (relied on findings that plaintiff did not know of injury
within statutory period); Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd,
594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) (injury and cause subtler than normal
malpractice, inappropriate to determine as a matter of law what plaintiff should have known);
Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 788 (1991). See infra rlotes 55-58, 251-93 and
accompanying text.
37. 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
840 (1979).
38. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff's presenting problem was "harried housewife
syndrome."
39. Id.
40. Id. However, the court denied summary judgment on the ground that sufficient evidence
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This plaintiff's inability to protest the maltreatment is common among
survivors of therapist sexual abuse. One commentator notes that in her
work with victims, nearly all have been unable to complain of the abuse
for a period of time.41 She reports that her clients are unable to reveal the
fact of abuse for, on the average, eight years. 42 Her observations are in
accord with those of other professionals.43 In fact, studies indicate that only
4-8% of victims of psychotherapist sexual exploitation ever report the
behavior or bring civil suits." The special relationship between psychoth-
erapists and patients renders patients unable to recognize their injuries or
seek redress.
45
D. Why Damage Occurs
The nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship grants great power
to the psychotherapist." The psychotherapist must exercise this power for
the client's benefit in order for therapy to be effective.47 Manipulating this
power for a therapist's own benefit exploits the patient" and prevents further
healing. 49 Sexual exploitation by a psychotherapist destroys the fundamental
existed that the plaintiff's failure to discover her injury was caused by the defendant's conduct.
Id. at 770.
41. E. Disch, In Defense of a Flexible Definition of Discovery & a Flexible Statute of
Limitations in Cases of Sexual Abuse by Psychotherapists 2-3 (1990) (unpublished paper).
42. Id.
43. See Gartrell, Reporting Practices, supra note 11, at 293.
44. Id. at 289.
45. For a discussion, see T. Gutheil, Insights: Patient-Therapist Sexual Relations: The Search
for Clarity in Complexity 3-5 (1989) (unpublished paper) [hereinafter T. Gutheil, Insights]; see
also infra notes 46-74 and accompanying text.
46. See T. Gutheil, Insights, supra note 45, at 5 ("imn therapy, the therapist's power derives
not only from special legal sanctions ... but from transference attributions and the dependency
that some patients come to feel for the therapist"). Power is seldom defined in either psychiatric
literature or in discussions of fiduciary law but the concept appears to be the same for both -
the ability to make changes that affect the entrusting party. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL.
L. Ray. 795, 809 n.47 (1983). Others have defined "power" as "a means or capacity to coerce."
See R. HALE, Fa mDoM THRouoH LAW 30 (1952), cited in Frankel, supra. However, Hale's
definition of power appears too narrow to encompass fiduciary relationships.
47. Dagish, Many Legal Pitfalls and Ethical Dilemmas Exist in Psychiatry, The Psychiatric
Times, Feb. 1989, at 8 ("[tlhe physician-patient relationship is supposed to be a fiduciary one,
geared entirely to the welfare of the patient").
48. See Marmor, supra note 16, at 323.
It is precisely on the implicit and explicit assumption that this trust [between a
psychotherapist and patient] will not be betrayed that the patient is encouraged to
lay aside her customary guard and psychological defenses and open herself com-
pletely to the presumably benign influence of the therapist's professional skill. She
is particularly vulnerable and defenseless under such circumstances, and when a
therapist exploits the transference to seduce a woman patient her apparent consent
is really meaningless. Thus, the use of the term rape to describe the occurrence is
not without some validity.
Id.
49. Pope, How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact, supra note 2, at 223. "Amatory and
sexual interaction between client and therapist dooms the potential for successful therapy and is
detrimental if not devastating to the client." Id. (quoting L. Durre).
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characteristics of the therapy relationship ° and causes long-term develop-
mental harm to the client.5' This section will examine in detail why clients
often face debiliating mental injury from sexual misconduct.
1. Vulnerability and Intimacy Lead to Power Imbalance
Most clients are vulnerable when they enter therapy. 52 Clients come to
therapy with personal crises and problems that they have been unable to
50. See Stone, Boundary Violations Between Therapist and Patient, 6 PsYcmAiuc ANNAis
670 (1976) [hereinafter Stone, Boundary Violations] ("a psychiatrist who permits such [a sexual]
encounter is subjecting Hs patient to a betrayal of trust precisely where she was most troubled
to begin with and where she is most vulnerable").
51. See 0. SCHOENEn, PsYcHOTHERAPs Ts' SExuAL LVoLvmMENT wrrH CLNTs, supra note
1, at 76.
The clients who have sought my help for problems stemming from sexual exploi-
tation by therapists or counselors have seemed 'stuck' in resolving the issues they
were attempting to master at the time the exploitation began. They also have
diminished self-esteem, problems forming relationships with others, and problems
succeeding in other life tasks (e.g., parenting, school, or career).
Id.
How sexual exploitation affects the "development of identity" depends in part upon such
things as age of the client at the time the exploitation occurred, the duration and extent of the
abuse, and if and how other important relationships were disrupted. Id.
52. The concept of the vulnerability of the patient is common to many schools of therapy.
In psychoanalytic thought, the relationship between the patient and psychoanalyst is conceptualized
in the transference process. See G. CoREY, THEORY & PRACTnCE OF CouNs No AND PSYCHO-
THERAPY 21 (1982). Transference is a process by which clients attribute to the neutral, objective
psychoanalyst "unfinLshed business" from past relationships with significant others. The treatment
process requires the reccnstruction and reliving of past events. As therapy progresses, clients
resurrect childhood feelings, emotions and conflicts buried in the unconscious. Id. At these times,
the patient is in a state of emotional regression. Id. See also Smith, The Seduction of the Female
Patient, in SExuAL EcPrrATioN By PRoFrSSmoNAs 58 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989). Proponents of
this theory believe that, in this state, a patient is unable to realistically evaluate the actions of
the psychotherapist, making her vulnerable to him. Id. The therapist becomes all-powerful. G.
CoREY, supra, at 21.
Harry Stack Sullivan extends psychoanalytic theory with his interpersonal theory. In contrast
to the neutral, objective observer, he views the therapist as a participant/observer and expert in
interpersonal relations. Id. at 47. He stresses the power a therapist has over his client and urges
the therapist to use the relationship as an agent for change. Id. at 49.
A second group of therapies - existential, person-centered and Gestalt therapy - have
philosophically reacted against the psychoanalytic approach. This view is grounded on the
assumption that people are free, whereas psychoanalysis considers freedom to be constricted by
unconscious forces, irraticnal drives and the past. Id. at 61. However, these theories also recognize
the vulnerability of client,; coming to therapy. Id. at 61.
In existential therapy, clients are encouraged to take responsibility for how they now choose
to be in therapy. The therapist encourages clients to take action based on the insights they
develop in the therapeutic process. Id. at 66. The opening of these doors is anxiety producing,
after making clients feel vulnerable and insecure. Corey gives as an example the notes one of
his clients kept for herself during therapy. She writes:
I started therapy today. I was terrified, but I didn't know of what. Now I do.
First of all, I was terrified of Jerry himself. He has the power to change me. I'm
giving him that power and I can't go back ... I've sandblasted security right out
of my life and I'm really frightened of who I'll become.
Id.
A similar theory, client-centered therapy, emphasizes the "personal characteristics of the
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resolve themselves .3 Many times patients lack self-esteem or are fearful
and doubting of their own sanity. 4 Patients often feel they must rely
upon a professional to help them resolve their conflicts." Clients come
to therapy in search of approval 6 and concrete answers to their
problems.17 Struggling with their private crises, many clients are in a
helpless, almost childlike position in relation to the therapist.58 The
therapist and the quality of the client/therapist relationship as the prime determinants of the
outcome of the therapeutic process." Id. at 81. This method of counseling is nondirective,
assuming that people have a vast potential for resolving their own issues without direct intervention
by the counselor. Id. at 80-81. According to Rogers, there are six conditions necessary for
personality changes:
(1) Two persons in psychological contact.
(2) The client is in a state of incongruence, being vulnerable or anxious.
(3) The therapist is congruent or integrated in the relationship.
(4) The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client.
(5) The therapist experiences empathic understanding of the client's internal frame
of reference and endeavors to communicate this to the client.
(6) The communication of empathic understanding and unconditional positive
regard is to minimal degree achieved.
Id. at 86. Thus, even in this mode of relating, the vulnerability of the client is pre-supposed.
Behavior therapy differs from all of the previous approaches as it is primarily concerned with
modifying behavior rather than exploring historical causes of present behavior. See id. at 141.
Behaviorists assume an active, directive role in the relationship. They attempt to apply scientific
principles to finding solutions to human problems. A behaviorist may function as a teacher,
director, expert, and role model in the relationship. Id. at 145. Therapists in this mode of
counseling play a crucial role as a figure worthy of emulation. Clients often pattern their attitudes,
values, beliefs, and behavior after the therapist. Id. Thus, it appears that even in the schools of
thought removed from psychoanalytic theory, the client is vulnerable. While some schools seem
to eschew the inherent vulnerability of a client entering therapy, they seem to be in agreement
that a therapist wields great power over the client, and thus, may become vulnerable in the
relationship.
53. See G. SCHOENER, PSYCHOTHERAPIsTS' SExuAL INVoLvE MEr wrr CLIEWrs, supra note
1, at 75 (the client is vulnerable and feels childlike because of inability to manage life without
assistance).
54. See id. at 68-71 (because clients are largely uninformed about proper therapy techniques
and many clients feel vulnerable, they are hesitant to trust gut instincts concerning sexual
involvement).
55. See Kardener, Sex & the Physician Patient Relationship, supra note 5, at 1135 ("[w]hen
one seeks professional help for a hurt, one is placed emotionally in a childlike posture of
dependency characterized by varying degrees of vulnerability, with a concomitant necessity that
trust be placed in the wiser, more experienced (parentoid) healer").
56. See id. at 1135 (the need to be loved and the desire to feel special to an important
"other" must be considered universal among human emotions); 0. ScEromEN, PsYcHoTHERAPiSm'
SExuAL INvoLvEmENT wrr CLmNTs, supra note 1, at 87-88 (client seeks validation as good person
from therapist). According to Rogers' client-centered therapy, the therapist must communicate
unconditional caring that is not contaminated by evaluation or judgment of the client's thoughts,
feelings or behavior. G. CoREY, supra note 52, at 87-88. According to Rogers, the greater the
degree of acceptance of the client, the greater the chance therapy will be effective. Id. at 88. It
is this unconditional validation of the client as a person that helps create the therapeutic
environment which allows clients to explore "the hidden aspects of their personal world." Id. at
85.
57. G. CoREy, supra note 52, at 230 (initial expectations of clients are expert help and fast
change, often expecting "magic" cure from therapist).
58. See G. SCHOEmR, PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WrrH CLINTS, supra note
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therapist often becomes a parental-type caretaker, exercising a power
over the patient similar to a parent's power over a child. s9
Superimposed over the patient's basic vulnerability is the high degree of
intimacy present in the therapeutic setting. This intimacy further increases the
relationship's power imbalance. 60 One commentator has noted, "Counseling
is a process by which clients are invited to look honestly at their behavior
and life-style and make certain decisions about the ways in which they want
to modify the quality of their life. ' 6' In therapy, clients are encouraged to
discuss candidly their innermost thoughts, wishes, and desires, whether socially
acceptable or not.A Before clients can begin the task of self-revelation and
evaluation, they :must experience a psychological climate which grants them
the freedom to safely reveal their innermost thoughts, wishes, and desires.63
The therapist create3 this environment by first establishing a confidential and
secure setting in -which the patient is encouraged to cast aside all defenses,
64
and then persuading the client of the trustworthiness of both the climate and
the therapist.6s
1, at 75.
When the client seeks help, even a healthy individual may feel there is nobody he/
she can trust completely - except the therapist. Thus, both cultural stereotypes
tend to idealize both therapists and parents, which leads to an extremely high level
of trust, a desire to preserve the idealization, and a tendency to accede to the
demands made upon them. Self-protective instincts are weakened or, at times,
ignored in both situations.
Id.
59. Id.; see also Marmor, supra note 16, at 322 (unconscious transference relationship between
patient and psychotherapist tends to replicate child/parent relationship).
60. See Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 Tmap. L.Q.
401, 405 (1957) [hereinafter, Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers] (whatever psychiatrist has
learned intimately of a client's affairs, the psychiatrist has learned in a soundproof office, alone
with a patient who "fearfully confided his thoughts and deeds in order to overcome the misery
of his symptoms").
61. G. CoREr, supra note 52, at 228.
62. See Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers, supra note 60, at 405.
The patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal material
of the most disturbing nature. He did not, after all, come into therapy to find out
what a fine fellow he is. He is expected to bring all manner of socially unacceptable
instincts and urges, immature wishes, perverse sexual thoughts - in short the
unspeakable, the unthinkable, the repressed. To speak of such things to another
human requires an atmosphere of unusual confidence and trust.
Id.
63. See G. CoREY, supra note 52, at 85.
64. See Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers, supra note 60, at 405 ("psychiatry must offer
complete privacy and strictest confidence to its patients... [s]urely no genuine therapy can occur
unless clients trust the privacy of their revelations to their therapists ... [iut is the therapist's
responsibility to define the degree of confidentiality that can be promised"); Stone, Sexual
Misconduct by Psychiatrists: The Ethical & Clinical Dilemma of Confidentiality, 140 Am. J.
PsyCHiATRY 195, 196 (19:3) [hereinafter Stone, Sexual Misconduct] (confidentiality merits special
consideration in psychiatry because it is necessary to protect privacy of patients and because
expectation of privacy is essential to the process of psychotherapy itself).
65. See Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers, supra note 60, at 405. "Patients will only be
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/2
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Confidentiality is a requirement for establishing the psychotherapeutic en-
vironment and is prescribed by professional ethics. Few clients would be
willing to reveal their innermost secrets without assurances that these secrets
will not be exposed. Often, the secrets revealed in therapy are known only
to the client and the therapist.6 This further enhances the intimacy between
the patient and the therapist6 and may serve to bind the patient to the
therapist.6s
While counseling theory requires that the patient reveal everything, this
same theory commands the therapist to reveal little of the therapist's own
self.69 Unilateral self-revelation gives the therapist power to use information
acquired from the patient, without risk.70 Therapists must be "continually
cognizant" of their powerful position in their relationships with clients.7' They
are ethically commanded to use their position of power only in ways directly
related to, and in furtherance of, treatment goalsY2
helped if they can form a trusting relationship with the psychiatrist. Psychotherapy otherwise
becomes an ineffective and intellectual exercise." Id. at 406.
66. See Stone, Sexual Misconduct, supra note 64 (discussing resolution of conflicts between
section four of the American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics, which requires
confidentiality, and the affirmative duty of psychiatrists to expose colleagues engaging in unpro-
fessional behavior). See also G. ScHoENER, PsYcHoTHERAPim£s' SEXUAL INVOLvEmENT wrH
CLIErs, supra note 1, at 66.
67. See Kardener, Sex & the Physician Patient Relationship, supra note 5, at 1135 ("the very
process of the psychotherapeutic reaction fosters a special quality of emotional intimacy").
68. See M. McGLL, Tn McGn.a REP RT oN MALE INTIMAcy 14 (1985) (discussing bonding
and intimacy).
The time we spend with others, and the variety of things we know about them,
lead us together, creating the interpersonal exchanges that lead to intimacy. A third
important source of this emotional bonding comes not from time spent together or
from the breadth of the relationship, but rather from the value of what is exchanged,
the depth of disclosure. The revelation to another person of something that is very
important to us, central to who we are, constitutes an intimate exchange, regardless
of the history of the relationship or what else the other may know about us.
Id.
69. Under classical psychoanalytic theory, the psychoanalyst is to engage in very little self-
revelation. See G. CoREY, supra note 52, at 20. (Classical analysts assume anonymity toward
clients, sometimes called blank-screen approach; they engage in very little self-disclosure to foster
transference relationship in which client will make projections onto them). Other theories of
counseling allow some self-disclosure, provided the disclosure serves the needs and interests of
clients and does not burden them or hinder them in exploring and understanding themselves. See
id. at 89.
70. See Feldman & Summers, Sexual Contact in Fiduciary Relationships, in SExuAL ExPLoi-
TATIONS BY PROFESSIONAIS 193 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989).
The vulnerability of either low self-esteem or high dependency is compounded if
the underlying feelings are revealed to the fiduciary. Having acquired such infor-
mation, the fiduciary is now in a position to misuse or exploit these weaknesses
on the part of the trusting client. Enhanced vulnerability due to revelation is
virtually inevitable in the therapist-client situation because the client is encouraged
to "tell-all."
Id. at 200.
71. AM. PSYCHOGICAL ALs'N, ETHcAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOL s 4 (1981).
72. AM. PSYciATTnuc Ass'N, PRiNCmiLES OF MEDICAL ET cs wrrH ANNOTATIONS ESPECALLY
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
In addition, as patients often model their behavior after their therapists,
therapists must conduct themselves with utmost propriety, even in personal
matters." Psychotherapists may have great power to influence the attitudes
and behaviors of their clients.
The very nature of the therapy environment - including the client's initial
vulnerability, the therapist's control of the environment, confidentiality, client
intimacy, and unilateral self-revelation - engenders a significant power im-
balance of the therapist over the patient. This power must be used solely for
the benefit of the client.7 4 This is the essence of therapy.
2. Misuse of Power Through Sexual Contact
Sexual contact with clients constitutes misuse of a therapist's power." Most
clients are uninformed or unclear about the propriety of erotic touch in the
therapy environment.7 6 Clients often depend upon? and idealize the therapist.
7
Many clients either do not trust or are unable to trust their judgment that
sexual involvement is improper.7 9 For a therapist to take advantage of a
patient's emotional dependence to gain personal gratification exploits the
therapist's power.80 Some commentators believe this exploitation to be of the
same magnitude as rape." Even in cases in which a patient is flirtatious or
APPicABLE To PSYCSCIARY § 2 (1985), quoted in G. SCHOmaNR, PSYCHOTHERASTS' SEXUAL
INvoLvm NTr wrr Cumrrs, supra note 1, at 68.
73. G. SCHOENER, supra note 1, at 68.
74. Id. at 67-68.
75. Id. at 65-72.
76. Id. at 68.
77. In Greenberg v. McCabe, the plaintiff testified that she had become so dependent on the
defendant therapist that "he became a God" to her and she would not question the therapy he
prescribed because she so feared displeasing him. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 771
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
78. See G. CoREY, supra note 52, at 21 (clients might develop positive transference and fall
in love with analyst, desire analyst to adopt them, seek love, acceptance, or approval from
therapist).
79. G. ScHomanm, PSYCHOTHEAS' SEa=AL INvoLVEMENT wIrH ClmNTs, supra note 1, at
68 (clients uninformed and unclear about propriety of touch in therapy and rules for sexual
involvement).
80. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
81. Id.; see also Masters & Johnson, supra note 1. In their address to the American Psychiatric
Association, the famous researchers expressed outrage at the numerous incidents of sexual
exploitation and urged cr.minalizing the behavior:
We feel that when sexual seduction of patients can be firmly established by due
legal process, regardless of whether the seduction was initiated by the patient or
the therapist, the therapist should be initially sued for rape rather than malpractice,
i.e., the process should be criminal rather than civil. Few psychotherapists would
be willing to appear in court on behalf of a colleague and testify that the sexually
dysfunctional patient's facility for decision-making could be considered normally
objective when he or she accepts submission after developing extreme emotional
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seductive, it is still an abuse of power when the therapist steps out of the
role of "healer" and succumbs to sexual temptation.s2
The damages to be expected from sexual exploitation have previously been
described." These damages occur because the misuse of power destroys the
foundations of the relationship.84
The psychotherapist changes roles from a neutral and objective source of
approval to a lover.s5 In doing so, the therapist loses the ability to guide the
patient's growth and development. The patient then is psychologically "or-
phaned," losing the parentlike mentor. This alone may cause a reactivation
of prior conflicts.
88
Misuse of the power differential may also forestall long-term emotional
development. 9 Many patients report having imaginary conversations with their
therapists in order to self-evaluate feelings and attitudes and make decisions. 90
This internalized therapist helps clients continue their growth and develop-
ment.9' Breaking trust with clients destroys this avenue of their development. 92
Also, clients may doubt the truthfulness and effectiveness of all therapy,
undoing prior work and precluding future help. 93
82. See Stone, Boundary Violations, supra note 50, at 674 (doctor-patient relationship fidu-
ciary; even women willing to engage in sex with therapists have right to consider themselves
victims); Pope, How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact, supra note 2 (it is always the
therapist's responsibility to ensure sexual contact does not occur). One commentator has addressed
the claim made by psychotherapists that they were seduced by their patients by analogizing the
seductive patient's requested act (sex) with the masochistic patient's requested act (being beaten).
See infra note 130.
83. See supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text. See also generally Pope, How Clients are
Harmed by Sexual Contact, supra note 2, at 222-25; G. SCHOENER, PsYcHoTam"aISTS' SEXUAL
INVOLVEmENT wrrH CLmNTs, supra note 1, at 103-45 (describing common client experiences, male
experiences and guidelines for assessing damages); Apfel & Simon, Patient-Therapist Sexual
Contact, supra note 20, at 57-62 (cataloguing effects on patient of sexual conflict with therapist).
84. See Bouhoutsos, Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists & Patients, supra note 17.
85. Kardener, Sex & the Physician-Patient Relationship, supra note 5, at 1135.
86. Id. at 1136.
87. Id.
88. See Apfel & Simon, Patient Therapist Sexual Contact, supra note 20, at 60 (discussing
ways in which sexual involvement may lead to reactivation of prior symptoms or failure to
address issues which brought patient to therapy in the first place).
89. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
90. See Pfeffer, The Meaning of the Analyst After Analysis, 11 J. Am. PSYCHOANALYTIC A.
229, 243 (1962). "[Tihere is manifested in vivid form a repetition of the essence of the analysis
- from unresolved conflict to resolution and in relation to the analyst, but now telescoped into
a relatively short period of time .... [I]n life situations this same capacity to regress and progress
facilitates adaptation." Id.
91. Id. at 243. See also Geller, Cooley & Hartley, Images of the Psychotherapist: A Theoretical
& Methodological Perspective, in 1 ImAaNArION, COGNTON & PERSONALrrY 123 (1981-82). "The
vividness of the representation and the use of the representation for the purpose of continuing
the therapeutic dialogue are significantly correlated with self-perceived improvement." Id.
92. See also Jorgenson, Randles & Strasburger, Psychotherapist-Patient Sex, supra note 1, at
26.
93. See Pope, Research & Laws Regarding Therapist-Patient Sex, supra note 4, at 566-67.
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II. The Psychotherapist as a Fiduciary: Legal Responsibility
Commensurate with Risk of Harm
Fiduciary theory provides a model by which a psychotherapist should be
judged in all dealings with clients.94 A "fiduciary relation" is a relationship
in which trust and confidence are necessarily reposed by one party, investing
in the other party a corresponding amount of power.95 The term embraces a
variety of relationships and may arise any time one party's position is "trustee-
like" in regard to another party.9 Examples of fiduciary relationships include
those between attomeys and their clients, guardians and wards, principals
and agents, and executors and heirs.Y
The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the parties do not deal on
equal terms." The relationship arises because one party desires a benefit or
service from another party which requires him to entrust power to the other
party." The more powerful party or "fiduciary" who accepts that trust of
power is in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent
party or "entrustor."' ' 0 The more an individual must entrust to receive the
intended benefit, the more power the fiduciary wields.' 0'
94. For discussion of general fiduciary principles, see Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25
U. ToRoNTo L.J. 1 (1SY75); Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMaRtoE L.J. 69 (1962);
Frankel, supra note 46, at 795.
95. Fiduciary theory is a product of Roman law. See Adams, Benefiting from Fiduciary
Office: A Presumption of Fraud, 47 Tax. BAR J. 648, 649 (1984). It has been a fixture of
common law for centuries. See Frankel, supra note 46, at 795 n.l. Slowly, fiduciary law has
expanded and embraced many different types of relationships, imposing a high duty of fidelity
on those named as fiduciaries. Id.; see also BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979) ("li]t
exists where there is special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is
bound to act in good faith and with due regard to interests of one reposing the confidence").
The term "entrustor" will be used in this article to denote the dependent individual who must
repose confidence in the relationship. This term was coined by Tamar Frankel. For its etymology,
see Frankel, supra ncte 94, at 800 n.17.
96. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 94, at 75. The terms "fiduciary" and "confi-
dential" relationship are sometimes used synonymously. See Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal.
App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (1983). Both types of relations ordinarily arise where
confidence is reposed by one person, granting the other corresponding power. Id. Likewise, both
confidential and fiduciary relationships require the individual in whom trust is reposed to take
no advantage from it. Id. However, important distinctions exist. Fiduciary relationships are
recognized legal relationships, such as guardian to ward and attorney to client, while "confiden-
tial" relationships include these but also may be founded on a "moral, social, domestic, or
interpersonal relationship." Id. The existence of a confidential relationship is usually a question
of fact for the fact-finder at trial. Id., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. However, where the relationship
is legally recognized as fiduciary, its existence is considered confidential as a matter of law. Id.
It is this article's contention that the psychotherapist-patient relationship should be legally
recognized as a fiduciary one.
97. See Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431; see also BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed.
1979).
98. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
99. Frankel, supra note 46, at 800 (by definition, the entrustor becomes dependent because
he or she must rely on the fiduciary for a particular service).
100. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
101. Frankel, supr. note 46, at 809.
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Because of the power differential inherent in the relationship, all fiduciary
relations subject the entrustor to a risk of abuse at the hands of the more
powerful party.Ir The more power an entrustor must grant to the fiduciary
to receive the intended benefit, the more vulnerable the trusting individual
becomes to abuse of that power by the fiduciary.' The law has long
recognized the need to protect these less powerful individuals.
104
The purpose for legal control of fiduciary relationships is to diminish this
risk of abuse. °u However, recognition of the variety of fiduciary situations
eschews the creation of a single set of legal rules or method of handling these
cases.'10 Rather, the courts must consider each circumstance with regard given
to the amount of power exercised by the fiduciary in that particular type of
relationship. °7 In determining the existence of a fiduciary relationship and
fashioning the appropriate rules, the courts should analyze the nature of the
relationship, the degree of power imbalance and the availability of alternative
protections for the entrusting party. 1 Accordingly, the greater the risk of a
fiduciary's abuse, the more the law should be willing to protect the trusting
party.'09
A. Standard of Care of Fiduciaries
Two ways the court may protect the entrustor are by placing higher
standards of care upon the professional"0 and imposing specific duties cor-
responding to that level of care."' Fiduciaries are held to a higher degree of
care than those involved in arm's-length transactions.'" Courts do not gen-
erally acknowledge or systematize the various levels of care that may be
required in differing situations."3 However, courts should determine the level
102. Id. at 807-08.
103. Frankel points to two characteristics of fiduciary relationships which increase the risk of
abuse in such a relationship. The first is "substitution" - the fiduciary performs a service in
place of the "entrustor." The second feature is that "the fiduciary obtains power from the
entrustor ... for the sole purpose of enabling the fiduciary to act effectively." Id. at 809. For
a discussion of "power," see supra notes 46, 52-74 and accompanying text.
104. Adams, supra note 95, at 649.
105. Frankel, supra note 46, at 811.
106. Id. at 805-07.
107. Id. at 807.
108. Id. at 810.
109. Id. at 807-08, 811, 818. The legal duties imposed upon a fiduciary are coextensive with
the degree of power the fiduciary holds over the other party. See Brown, Franchising - A
Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. Ra,. 630, 664 (1971).
110. See Frankel, supra note 46, at 823 (In contrast to status and contract relations, courts
more actively supervise fiduciary relations, requiring fiduciaries to act with loyalty and skill in
the entrustor's interest; as the amount of power delegated or length of relation increases, judicial
intervention will as well).
111. Id. at 824 (court can protect entrustor by regulating fiduciary).
112. See generally Frankel, supra note 46, at 801-02 (contrasting fiduciary, status, and contract
relationships).
113. However, a few courts have extended a higher degree of care to certain fiduciaries. See,
e.g., Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1983) (psychiatrist's duties
more stringent than a physician's); Beery v. State Bar of Cal., 43 Cal. 3d 802, 739 P.2d 1289,
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of care required, by examining the purpose of the relationship and the possible
consequences that abuse of the relationship might bring.11 4 In some cases,
courts will declare that the highest level of care will be required." 5 By
examining the characteristics of the relationship, the court remains sensitive
to differences in varying types of fiduciary relationships, while requiring higher
standards of conduct of those exercising the most power.
In a psychotherapist-patient relationship, the degree of success of treatment
is directly related to the amount of trust the patient reposes. 1 6 This trust is
the "raison d'etre" for the relationship." 7 It permeates all dealings with the
patient, not just those concerning the patient's presenting illness."' Patients
who place utmost trust in their therapists must be afforded assiduous protec-
tion by the law. Several jurisdictions have recognized this." 9 Because abuse
of the power the the-rapist holds may impair the patient's mind, one case has
found that a psychiatrist is held to a higher standard of care than other
doctors.1 ° The risk a patient must endure to reap expected benefits from the
therapist warrants the extension of a very high duty of care.12 The duty may
be fairly placed upon therapists, as they "invite" clients' confidences by
representing themselves as professional confidantes.'2
1294, 239 Cal. Rptr. 121, 126 (1987) (attorney-client relationship is fiduciary relationship of "the
very highest degree").
114. Frankel, supra note 46, at 810.
115. See Beery, 739 P.2d at 1294, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (attorney-client relationship is fiduciary
of "very highest degree"). For examples of differing standards applied to fiduciaries, see Frankel,
supra note 46, at 825 n.98.
116. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
117. This description of the counselor-counselee relationship is used in Strock v. Presnell, 38
Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1246 (1988) (Sweeney, J. dissenting). Judge Sweeney stated:
This case does nct resemble your garden variety seduction scenario. The wife did
not get involved with the milkman, the mailman or the guy next door. Here, the
couple's mini ser, under the guise of offering pastoral counseling services, abused
the trust placed in him. This trust was the raison d'etre of the relationship.
Id. These thoughts are amply supported by the professional literature. See supra notes 46-93 and
accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. See also L.L. v. Medical Protective Co.,
122 Wis. 2d 455, 362 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1984) (discussing need for psychiatrist to conduct himself
properly in all actions a.,; patients model behavior after therapist); Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C.
App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837-38 (1983) (expert testimony concludes that psychiatrist's duty
extends beyond hospital or consulting room to social situations).
119. See Horak v. Blirs, 130 l. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1985) (defendant's social
work license placed him in position of trust; violation of that trust constitutes breach of fiduciary
relationship); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 788 (1991) (there are fiduciary
aspects to psychothe-apist-patient relationship); Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300
S.E.2d 833, 839 (1983) (psychotherapist abused position of "trust and confidence"); Roy v.
Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
120. Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1983) (basic duties of
physician apply and are more stringent with psychiatrist).
121. Id. at 838. For . discussion of the damages likely to result from a sexually exploitative
counseling relationship, .;ee supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
122. Because a therapist by the very nature of the profession invites confidence, he or she
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B. Duties Of A Fiduciary
The most basic tenet of fiduciary theory is that in all transactions associated
with or arising out of the relationship, fiduciaries must act with utmost good
faith and solely for the benefit of the entrustor.n 3 All of the actions of a
fiduciary should be judged according to this requirement. 124 A therapist as a
fiduciary should also be held to this standard. Acting in a patient's best
interest requires a therapist to refrain from all activities which pose an
unreasonable risk of harm to patients.1 5 One court described this duty:
We think that the very nature of the therapist-patient relationship
... gives rise to a clear duty on the therapist's part to engage
only in activity or conduct which is calculated to improve the
patient's mental or emotional well-being, and to refrain from any
activity or conduct which carries with it foreseeable and unreason-
able risk of mental or emotional harm to the patient.126
The injuries associated with sexual contact in a therapeutic relationship
have been well documented and described.1 7 Accordingly, sexual contact
exposes clients to an unreasonable risk of harm and should be considered a
breach of a psychotherapist's fiduciary duty toward clients.12 The duty to
refrain from sexual conduct belongs entirely to therapists as they have un-
dertaken to provide the service.' 9 Regardless of the client's willingness,
falls within the technical definition of fiduciary which reads in part: "A person having duty,
created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such
undertaking." BLACK's LAW DIcTnoNARY 564 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). See also Toombs
v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1985) (court held a fiduciary relationship may exist
where there is a difference in business experience and an invited confidence).
123. See Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (1983) (an
attorney as a fiduciary is required to exercise the utmost good faith); Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz.
305, 576 P.2d 493, 496 (1978) (a physician may be in a fiduciary relationship with his or her
patient which would require the physician "to exercise the utmost good faith").
124. See Hobbs v. Eichler, 164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403 (1985) (relationship
between broker and principal is fiduciary; imposes duty on broker to act in highest good faith
toward principal); Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432 (relation between attorney and client highly
fiduciary; binds attorney to "most conscientious fidelity"); Plaquemihes Parish Comm'n Council
v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (La. 1987) (elected public officials are bound to
exercise official functions with utmost honesty and fidelity).
125. See Horak v. Binis, 130 IMI. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1985); Mazza v. Huffaker,
61 N.C. App. 130, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1983); L.L. v. Medical Protective Soc'y, 122 Wis. 2d
455, 362 N.W.2d 172, 177 (1984).
126. Horak v. Biris, 130 IMI. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1985).
127. See supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 17 (holding therapist to fiduciary standard); Mazza, 300
S.E.2d at 839 (sustaining trial court's finding that relationship was one of trust and confidence);
Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 301 (C iv. Ct. 1975) (there is public policy
to protect patient from deliberate, malicious abuse of power, breach of trust).
129. Fiduciary relationships, unlike status relationships, are created with the consent of the
fiduciary. The law allows parties to enter these relations freely; however, once entered, the duties
of the fiduciary will largely be determined by law. See Frankel, supra note 46, at 820. As
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seductiveness, or aggressiveness, therapists have no justification for engaging
in activity which poses unreasonable danger. 1""
A fiduciary relationship, including a psychotherapist-patient relationship,
satisfies the needs of the entrusting party alone. The fiduciary generally
receives compensation.' When therapists enter sexual relationships with their
patients, they place their own needs and desires above those of their clients,
discussed in the text at supra note 123, the highest duty of any fiduciary is to act with utmost
good faith, solely for the benefit of the client. Any activity which unreasonably threatens the
patient's welfare is therefore per se prohibited. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
Since sexual intimacy threatens the patient's well-being, it should be proscribed absolutely. Such
a proscription is fair to the therapist, as he or she has entered the relationship voluntarily.
130. See J. Wohlberg, The Psychology of Therapist Sexual Misconduct: A Victim's Perspective
(Feb. 10, 1990) (paper presented at The Boston Psychoanalytic Society). In her presentation,
Wohberg stated:
Unfortunately, many in the mental health professions seem to take comfort in the
idea of the seductive patient. Somehow, they use this to rationalize the breaking
of professional b3undaries either for themselves or their colleagues. I suggest there
is no conceivable justification for this conduct; and this would be so even if this
absurd stereotype were accurate.
Assume with me for a moment that what is being described by the therapeutic
community is pathological, but that this pathology is not seductive behavior but
masochism. In cther words, the patient doesn't suggest that she would like to
become sexually involved with her therapist but rather that she would like to be
beaten by him.
Is it possible to believe that a therapist who obliges that request could be excused
by pleading that his patient had taken advantage of his sadistic tendencies? If not,
I have to wonder about the dual standard that appears to be at work in the case
of sexual abuse.
Id. at 4. Psychiatric lit--rature supports Wohlberg's premise that psychiatrist and other mental
health professionals mtv refrain from sexual contact, even in the situation in which a patient is
openly seductive. Sec, e.g, P. RurrT, SEx iN Tm FomDEN ZONE, reprinted in PsYCHO OGY
TODAY, Oct. 1989, at ?4, 36. In describing an encounter with a seductive patient, the author
concludes that the patient was re-enacting her role as a victim with him. "I realized at that
critical moment, the path taken depended not on her, but on me." Id. Kardener, Sex & the
Physician-Patient Relationship, supra note 5, at 1135 ("it is duty of physician to guide patent's
growth and development ... without sacrificing his availability as a caretaker"); Masters &
Johnson, supra note 1; Stone, Boundary Violations, supra note 50, at 675 ("it cannot be
overemphasized that, however much the high risk patient wants to seduce her therapist, as much
or more of her desire 1.es in testing whether the therapist, in contrast to all the other men she
has known, can actually be trusted to safeguard her rights and allow her to grow and mature
unmolested").
Fiduciary theory requires the fiduciary to engage in conduct solely designed for the welfare of
the patient. See De;tefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). If sexual contact is
damaging, as psychiatric literature indicates, then the fiduciary has an absolute obligation to
avoid that risk of harm. See supra note 129.
131. Frankel, supra note 46, at 801. Fiduciaries need not receive compensation. It is by virtue
of their position in relation to the entrustor that the fiduciary's duties derive. Id. However,
fiduciary relationships usually are professional relationships. They are legally recognized relation-
ships such as guardian to ward, trustee to beneficiary, principal to agent or attorney to client.
Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (1983). As such, a
fiduciary is not prevented from obtaining fees for his or her services and indeed, usually does.
Frankel, supra note 46, at 819.
200
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breaching their fiduciary duties.1 12 This kind of breach destroys the founda-
tions of the therapeutic alliance' and deprives patients of the benefits for
which they are compensating their therapists. Thus sexually exploitative ther-
apists in effect breach their duty twice when they act to further their own
interests at their clients' expense and when they deprive their patients of the
benefits of therapy.
C. Undue Influence
As part of the fiduciary's duty to act with utmost good faith and solely
for the benefit of the entrustor, fiduciaries may also be required to disclose
all material facts which might affect the rights and interests of the vulnerable
party.M This duty should be imposed when the client is less knowledgeable
and must rely upon the expertise of the fiduciary for assistance. 3 5 By requiring
disclosure, courts attempt to protect an entrustor from undue influence.136 In
a fiduciary relationship, influence is naturally exerted by the more powerful
party over the less powerful party. 37 This influence becomes "undue" when
the fiduciary gains an advantage or benefit.3 ' The courts have long guarded
132. See generally Feldman-Summers, Sexual Contact in Fiduciary Relationships, in SEXUAL
EXPLOrrATION iN PROFss oNAL RmEATIONSHIPS 193 (G. Gabbard ed. 1989).
133. See Marmor, supra note 16, at 322. Basic trust is the foundation of a beneficial
psychotherapist-patient relationship as it is of a good parent-child relationship. It is precisely on
the implicit and explicit assumption that this trust will not be betrayed that the patient is
encouraged to lay aside her customary social and psychological defenses and open herself
completely to the presumably benign influence of the therapist's professional skill. She is
particularly vulnerable and defenseless under these circumstances. Id.
What makes sexual intimacy with a patient so egregious is that this trust is exploited to meet
the needs of the therapist rather than utilized for the patient's benefit. R. SiMON, supra note 5,
at 286.
134. See Burns v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 394 F.2d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1968); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 934, 444 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (1983); Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz,
10 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 406 N.E.2d 678, 683 (1980). See also Neel v. Magana, Oiney, Levy,
Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845 (1971); Plaquemines
Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (La. 1987); Willis v. Maverick,
760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988).
135. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (court applied the discovery
rule to an attorney malpractice situation, as the relationship between attorney and client is based
on trust, and, in addition, the client is less knowledgeable and must rely upon the expertise of
the attorney).
136. Estate of McRae v. Watkins, 522 So. 2d 731, 737 (Miss. 1988) (because of fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient, transaction will be deemed void). See also Butler v.
Gleason, 214 Mass. 248, 101 N.E. 371, 372 (1931); see infra text accompanying notes 144-47.
137. Frankel, supra note 46, at 809.
138. Hawkes v. Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 93 N.E. 828, 830 (1911). The court stated:
Wherever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence
is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that
confidence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence
is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person
so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage,
although the transaction could not have been impeached if no such confidential
relation had existed.
Id. (quoting Lord Chelmsford in Tate v. Williamson, 2 L.R.-Ch. 55, 61 (Ch. App. 1866)).
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against the dangers of "cupidity and avarice" by declaring benefits conferred
on fiduciaries by their clients presumptively void. 39 In order to retain benefits,
fiduciaries must prove that their benefits were not conferred as a result of
abuse of the relationship, thus reversing the burden of proof in these cases.' 40
They must show that the benefit was conferred after fair and full disclosure
and that it did not disadvantage their clients.' 4' At least one jurisdiction also
requires that fiduciaries prove that the client could deal with the fiduciary at
arm's length in regard to the matter from which the fiduciary receives
benefit. 42 Thus, even if a client understands the transaction, the court will
carefully scrutinize it in order to learn how the client's participation was
induced. 43
For example, in Butler v. Gleason,'44 the plaintiff was injured in a carriage
accident. She had, however, signed a release of liability for the defendant,
who raised the release as a defense.145 The court found that the defendant,
who was also the plaintiff's doctor, had obtained the release from the plaintiff
through assurances to her that she would be able to resume work and that
139. Estate of McRae v. Watkins, 522 So. 2d 731, 737 (Miss. 1988). In McRae, the elderly
patient of a physician was hallucinating that Indians and demons were dancing in her yard and
on top of her smoke house. The court held that even though the patient had legally deeded her
house and land to her physician, the physician was not allowed to keep the benefits. In holding
that a benefit conveyed by the beneficiary to his trustee was presumptively void, the court waxed
poetic: "While its application, like the tide, may ebb and flow, as long as cupidity and avarice
remain a part of the human character, courts will retain this salutary principle." Id. See also
Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc., 402 N.E.2d 76, 94 (Mass. 1980) (if attorney gains
advantage from transaction with client, it is presumptively voidable); Adams, supra note 95, at
649-51 (discussing generally doctrine of presuming fraud when fiduciary benefits from office).
140. Adams, supra note 95, at 649-51.
141. Searcy v. Novo, 188 So. 490, 491 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
142. Id. The court stated:
When a transaction between an attorney and his client is attacked, the burden is
cast upon the attorney to prove that it was not influenced by the relationship. He
must show that it was made in the best of faith and without disadvantage to his
client, that it was fair and equitable, and that the client was fully informed of his
rights and interets in the subject-matter of the transaction, of the nature and effect
of the transaction itself, and was so placed as to be able to deal with the attorney
at arm's length. (citation omitted)
Id. at 493.
143. One jurisdiction even "jealously" scrutinizes the transaction. See Butler v. Gleason, 214
Mass. 248, 101 N.E. 371, 372 (1931):
But the relation of a physician to his patient is necessarily one of trust and
confidence, and commercial transactions between them where fraud or undue
influence is charged, are viewed by the courts with some jealousy, and are carefully
scrutinized. If he solicits and procures a conveyance to himself of the property of
his patient, whelher by way of gift or of purchase, the burden, where the good
faith of the transaction is attacked, rests upon him to show that the patient's
confidence has not been abused, and that undue influence has not been exerted. It
is not sufficient that the patient knew what he was doing, but the question is how
the intention was produced.
Id.
144. 214 Mass. 248, 101 N.E. 371 (1931).
145. Id., 101 N.E. at 372-73.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/2
19911 THERAPIST SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES 203
if she did not sign the release he would be forced to take "the poor debtor's
oath."' 14 The court held that the doctor abused his position of trust by
making misrepresentations and inducing his patient to act against her own
interests. 147
Undue influence is also a risk associated with psychotherapy-patient rela-
tionships, and the protections recognized for other relationships are applica-
ble. 18 Courts should apply strict fiduciary duties and standards of conduct
to the psychotherapist-patient relationship in order to minimize the risk of
abuse to patients. In this context, fiduciary theory provides a rational, coherent
model by which to view psychotherapist-patient relationships.
III. Raising the Bar: Fiduciary Theory and Statutes of Limitations
Fiduciary theory provides psychotherapy abuse plaintiffs with a vehicle with
which to circumvent the statute of limitations bar imposed on tort claims.
49
The remainder of this article will consider the purpose and history of statutes
of limitations, explore the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment as a
tolling provision as they relate to the psychotherapist-patient relationship, and
offer a paradigm for determining when the statutory period should begin to
run.
A. Historical and Policy Reasons Behind Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are referred to by courts as tools of expedience. 50
They are pragmatic devices intended to encourage injured parties to bring
claims before evidence becomes unobtainable.' Fairness to defendants is the
146. Id., 101 N.E. at 373.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 771 (E.D. Pa..1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d
854 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) (plaintiff testified that therapist "became
a God" to her; she was dependent on him; feared displeasing him and would not question the
therapy he prescribed); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1991) (the plaintiff
became totally dependent on Dr. Presnell; on one occasion he expressed the opinion that his
psychiatrist might be "God"); Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300-01 (Civ.
Ct. 1975) (petition alleges coercion by person in position of overpowering influence; jury might
find that plaintiff could reasonably have submitted to intimate treatment in hope that condition
would improve). See also Estate of McRae v. Watkins, 522 So. 2d 731, 737 (Miss. 1988). The
court noted that physicians and attorneys have been encouraged to refer their clients to independent
third parties before receiving any benefit in order to insure that the transaction is free from
undue influence. Id. The argument may be made that this minimum requirement of referral to
an independent party should exist within the psychotherapist-patient context, particularly as it is
the patient's whole self that is being transacted, not just property or market shares.
149. See infra notes 177-293 and accompanying text.
150. See Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A.2d 389, 392 (1980).
151. Note, Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HA v. L. Rnv. 1177, 1185
(1950) [hereinafter, Note, Statutes of Limitations]. See also Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202,
422 A.2d 389, 392 (1980); Olsen, New Jersey Developments - The Discovery Rule in New
Jersey: Unlimited Limitation on the Statute of Limitations, 42 Ruruaas L. REv. 205, 206 (1989)
(chief purpose of statute of limitations to protect defendants from prejudice by lapse of time).
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primary rationale behind statutes of limitations.5 2 Defendants must be given
a fair opportunity to defend against claims before evidence becomes stale and
witnesses disappar.
Basic policies associated with statutes of limitations sometimes conflict with
the policy which values allowing meritorious claimants to have their day in
court.'1 Limitations periods are designed to run against those who fail to use
reasonable diligence in bringing claims. 5  They are not intended to "unjustly
deprive one of hds remedy.' 5 6 Occasionally cases arise in which it would be
patently unfair to strictly apply the applicable statute of limitations.5 7 These
cases often involve fiduciary relationships or other relationships in which a
high degree of trust and confidence is reposed by one party in another. In
recognition of this, the courts have carved out instances in which limitations
periods are extended or the running of the period is tolled. Two exceptions
to the statute of limitations are the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment
doctrine.' The authors contend that because of the fiduciary relationship
between patients and psychotherapists, the discovery rule and fraudulent
concealment doctrines should be readily available to this class of cases.
B. Applying the Discovery Rule to
Psychotherapist Sexual Abuse of Patients
1. Discovery Rule Defined
One of the more difficult issues involving statutes of limitations is deter-
mining when they commence running.5 9 Statutes of limitations generally begin
to run after a cause of action "accrues."' 60 This determination is left largely
to judicial interpretation.16' The courts have interpreted "accrual" to mean
152. Note, Statutes cf Limitations, supra note 151, at 1185. See also DeRose, Adult Incest
Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages,
25 SANTA CARA L. Rrv. 191, 216 (1988) [hereinafter DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors].
153. Note, Statutes cf Limitations, supra note 151, at 1185. See Decker, 422 A.2d at 392;
DeRose, Adult Incest SuIrvivors, supra note 152, at 216. See also United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (search for truth impaired by loss of evidence, disappearance of witnesses,
fading memories).
154. Note, Statutes of Limitations, supra note 151, at 1185. See also Annotation, Limitations
of Actions, 51 AM. Jus. 2D § 143 (1972) (law favors right of action rather than right of limitation
and statute which tols statute of limitation should be liberally construed); Olsen, supra note 151,
at 206 (discussing balan:ing of interests between plaintiff and defendant).
155. Note, Statutes of Limitation, supra note 151, at 1203. See also Evans v. Eckelman, 216
Cal. App. 3d 1608, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (1990).
156. Evans, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
157. See, e.g., Note, Statutes of Limitation, supra note 151, at 1203-05 (describing unfairness
of barring plaintiffs where wrong inherently unknowable during statutory period); Olsen, supra
note 151, at 206; O'Neal, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California's Discovery Exceptions
Swallow the Rule, 611 CAL. L. RaY. 106, 107-08 (1980) (discussing situations in which misrepre-
sentations made by defendant should toll statute of limitations).
158. Olsen, supra note 151, at 206-07. See also Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud & Statutes of
Limitation, 31 MIcH. L. Ray. 591 (1933).
159. Note, Statutes qf Limitations, supra note 151, at 1185.
160. See generally Annotation, Limitations of Actions, supra note 154, § I1.
161. W. KEaTON, D. DoBBs, R. KEaTON & D. OwEN, PRossER & KE To N oN TORTS § 30, at
[Vol. 44:181
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that a legal wrong will not mature until plaintiffs discover or should discover
that they have been harmed as the result of the defendant's conduct. 62 This
rule of construction is known as "the discovery rule."
The discovery rule has been adopted by the vast majority of states's and
has been applied to many areas of tort law.' 64 In their various holdings,
courts emphasize the principle that plaintiffs should be put on notice before
their claim is barred.' 6 Plaintiffs must have knowledge of their injury and
its cause before the statute of limitations begins to run against them.'6
However, lack of knowledge is generally not sufficient if a reasonably
prudent person in the plaintiff's position should have discovered personal
harm caused by the defendant's conduct.' 6 The courts apply the "reasonable
person" standard in determining plaintiffs' levels of knowledge and whether
they were under a duty to investigate suspicious circumstances.'1 Where the
167 (5th ed. 1984). See also Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458, 462-63 (1980)
(determination of accrual of a cause of action is left to judicial interpretation); Riley v. Presnell,
409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780 (1991) (legislature has not defined when cause of action accrues;
that is product of judicial interpretation). But cf. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 338(4) (West Supp.
1979) (cause of action in cases of fraud or mistake will not accrue until the discovery by aggrieved
party of facts constituting fraud or mistake).
162. See O'Neal, supra note 157, at 107. See also Teller v. Schepens, 381 Mass. 621, 411
N.E.2d 464, 467 (1980).
163. See Note, Accrual of the Cause of Action for Medical Malpractice: Penrod v. Hoskinson,
38 MoNT. L. Rav. 399, 401 n.22 (1977) (citing 38 states) [hereinafter Note, Medical Malpractice].
See also Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988); Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass.
621, 411 N.E.2d 458, 463 (1980).
164. The discovery rule has been applied to tort claims concerning occupational disease. See
Olsen v. Bell Tel., 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d 609 (1983). The rule has also been applied to
medical malpractice. See Kaufman v. Taub, 87 Ill. App. 3d 134, 410 N.E.2d 114 (1980). Further,
the rule has been applied to attorney malpractice. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart
& Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971). In Neel, the court stated:
[W]e find that the rule as to legal malpractice contrasts with the rule as to accrual
of causes of action against practitioners in all other professions; it ignores the right
of the client to rely upon the superior skill and knowledge of the attorney; it
denigrates the duty of the attorney to make full and fair disclosure to the client;
it negates the fiduciary character of the attorney-client relationship. We conclude
that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice, as for all professional mal-
practice, should be tolled until the client discovers, or should discover, his cause
of action.
Id., 491 P.2d at 422, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
165. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-70 (1949) (cause of action should not accrue
until victim has been apprised of his illness); Olsen v. Bell Tel., 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d 609,
611 (1983).
166. See, e.g., Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1988).
167. See, e.g., Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1113, 751 P.2d 923, 928, 245 Cal. Rptr.
658, 662-63 (1988) (a plaintiff need not be aware of the specific facts necessary to establish the
cause of action; once plaintiff has suspicion of wrongdoing, plaintiff must go find facts).
168. Malapanis v. Shirazi, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 383, 487 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1986) (stating
that statute of limitations period "commences to run when a reasonably prudent person [in the
tort claimant's position], reacting to any suspicious circumstances" should have discovered his
harm).
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relationship of the two parties is fiduciary in nature, the reasonable person
standard is moderated by the courts' recognition that the trust reposed by
victims may blind them to the wrongdoing because of undue influence.'6
In fiduciary or confidential relationships, the courts presume that the one
in whom trust is reposed exerts undue influence. 170 Courts should not impose
a duty on the plaintiff to investigate suspicious circumstances in these situa-
tions. 171 Also, in these jurisdictions, the plaintiff will not be deemed to have
the knowledge of facts which would have been disclosed by an investigation. 72
The statute will begin to run only after the plaintiff gains actual knowledge,
or knowledge of sufficient facts to place the plaintiff on notice.73 Courts use
the justification that facts which ordinarily require investigation may not incite
suspicion where the relationship is confidential, due to the fiduciary's position
of trust. 74 These rules may be useful in examining the legal significance of
injuries arising from a psychotherapist's sexual exploitation of patients.
2. Discovery Rude and Emotional Injury Cases
Undiscovered emotional injury cases provide for a unique application of
the discovery rule. 75 Psychological injuries and illnesses are recognized in the
scientific community as being as real and debilitating as other legally cogni-
zable injuries. Cass in which the plaintiff suffers a latent physical disease
and cases in which an attorney's negligence is undisclosed to the client provide
analogies for emotional injury cases. Courts have recognized these similarities
in incest cases. The psychological injuries suffered by victims of psychother-
apist sexual exploitation are sufficiently similar to other injuries which are
given judicial recognition under the discovery rule to warrant application of
the rule.'76 This section discusses these three areas of substantive law to which
the discovery rule applies and which provide analogies to psychotherapist-
patient malpractice actions.
169. See, e.g., Ne.l v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d
421, 427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 838 (1971); Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193
Cal. Rptr. 422, 433 (1983).
170. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431, 433 (attorney is in such a position as to enable him
to "exert unique influerce" over the client).
171. Willis v. Maverick, 750 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988).
172. See United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770,
83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970) (the court found that when an insurer sues a general agent and a
fiduciary relationship existed between the two, the usual duty of diligence to discover facts is not
required).
173. Neel, 491 P.2d r.t 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
174. Hobbs v. Eichler, 164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 404 (1985). The Hobbs
court held that when a fiduciary relationship exists, facts which usually should be investigated
would not invite suspicion and thus the usual duty of diligence to discover facts is suspended.
"Where the plaintiff is not under such duty to inquire, the limitations period does not begin to
run until she actually d',covers the facts constituting the cause of action, even though the means
for obtaining the information are available." Id. (emphasis added). See also supra notes 134-48
and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 183-268 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 177-88, 205-07, 225-50, 254, 260-68 and accompanying text.
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a) Analogy to Latent Disease
Discovery doctrines routinely extend to cases of latent disease. 1" The
reasoning is that it is unfair to bar plaintiffs' actions before they know of
their injuries. 78 Courts also prefer that claims be brought when the injury is
"ripe" - not while it is still a mere possibility.
1 79
Insidious diseases in many cases remain dormant or unrecognizable for a
period of time.lw They are often the result of prolonged exposure to the
reactive agent.' Courts hold that "blameless ignorance" of the encroachment
of a disease manifesting itself in physical injury will not bar an action for
the negligence precipitating it.In
Similarly, psychological and emotional damages do not manifest themselves
at the time the negligent act takes place. 83 The negligence takes place over a
period of time in the form of small seductions, mishandling of transference,
and gradual erosion of the boundaries of professional behavior.'8 Moreover,
undue influence may be exercised by a therapist over the patient, which keeps
the cause of action camouflaged.8 5 The victim's inability to recognize the
negligence or injury should likewise be viewed as blameless ignorance.8 6 A
177. A cause of action should not accrue until a victim has been apprised of her injuries. See
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949) (to not apply the discovery rule "would mean at
some past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, [the plaintiff]
was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of his lungs"). See also Olsen
v. Bell Tel., 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1983) ("the discovery rule has been applied
to causes of action based on 'inherently unknowable' wrongs").
178. Olsen, 445 N.E.2d at 612.
179. See Gore v. Daniel O'Connell, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 461 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1984).
180. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1948) (plaintiff became too ill to work
in 1940; subsequently diagnosed as having silicosis, a disease resulting from working daily in
silica dust over a period of years).
181. See, e.g., id. (involving an individual who unknowingly contracted silicosis as a result of
prolonged exposure to silica dust).
182. See id. at 170. The Supreme Court stated:
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to attach
to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with
the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the
assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of
legal rights.
Id.
183. DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors, supra note 152, at 213.
184. See, e.g., Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 764 (Mo. 1968) (court found that plaintiff,
while damaged by the therapist's sexual misconduct, had also been damaged by the therapist's
continuously occurring acts or omissions over a three-year period).
185. See supra note 148.
186. DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors, supra note 152, at 212-13. See also Riley v. Presnell,
409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 786 (1991). In Riley, the court examines how the injuries
themselves may interfere with the discovery of the cause of action. The court stated:
An injury to the mind could interfere with the discovery of the cause of action.
Here, Dr. Presnell has allegedly caused great psychological harm to Riley, and that
very harm allegedly caused Riley to be unable to link the misconduct to the damage.
Furthermore, there was evidence to support the conclusion that a reasonable person
who had been subject to the type of abuse alleged by Riley would have been unable
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victim of psychological injury can no more self-diagnose than can a victim
of latent disease.'8 This argument is enhanced by the fact that most psycho-
logical injuries may not ever manifest themselves physically - unlike the
victims of latent disease who at a point during the course of their disease
begin suffering extreme physical symptoms.'88
Application of the discovery doctrine to emotional injury would be consis-
tent with its application to latent disease. There appear to be no valid reasons
to differentiate between victims of insidious physical disease and victims of
latent psychological injury.
b) Analogy to Attorney-Client Relationship
The discovery nile has been extended to the attorney-client relationship in
two separate lines of cases.' In one line of cases, usually involving damage
resulting from simple negligence, the courts focus on the disparity of expertise
between the client and attorney.'90 The differential in knowledge effectively
camouflages a plaintiff's cause of action.' 9'
In the second line of cases, courts focus on the nature of the attorney-
client relationship. The discovery rule is applied to situations in which the
attorney receives a benefit from the client on the grounds that the nature of
the relationship dirainishes the client's duty to investigate.' 92 In these respects,
the psychotherapist-client relationship is sufficiently analogous to vindicate
use of the discovery rule and the lessened degree of diligence in sexual
misconduct cases.
(1) Mere Negligence
Courts place "a trust of the very highest character" on attorneys. 93 In
addition to the duty of reasonable care and contractual duties, attorneys have
a high duty of fidelity because of the unique nature of the relationship.' 94
to draw a causal connection between that improper therapy and the psychological
problems.
Id.
187. See Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D.D.C. 1989); Simmons v. United
States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Riley, 565 N.E.2d at 786 ("li]n other words, if the
defendant's conduct wculd, in an ordinary reasonable person, cause an injury which by its very
nature prevents the discovery of its cause, the action cannot be said to have accrued").
188. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1948) (plaintiff eventually became so ill
he was unable to work). For a discussion of the nature of psychological injury, see supra notes
18-45 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 193-229 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 193-224 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 208-29 and accompanying text.
193. Beery v. State Bar of Cal., 43 Cal. 3d 802, 739 P.2d 1289, 1294, 239 Cal. Rptr. 121,
126 (1987); see also Barbara A. v. John G. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432
(1983) (relation between attorney and client is fiduciary of highest character); Hendrickson v.
Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1974) (relation of attorney to client is highly fiduciary).
194. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. A cause of action was allowed against an attorney
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The fiduciary relationship imposes the duty to exercise the utmost good faith,
fairness, and fidelity.'19
One of the reasons for imposing these duties is that "the attorney is an
expert and much of his work is done out of the client's view."'9 The client
is not an expert and should not be expected to recognize professional negli-
gence.'19 In Merkley v. Beaslin,19 the court found that because the client
must rely on the attorney for expertise, advice, and assistance on matters in
a forum especially obscure to the client, fundamental fairness required the
application of the discovery rule.' 99
Many courts recognize clients' vulnerable positions and a majority apply
the discovery rule in cases where negligence occurs.2m In Hendrickson v.
Sears201 the court applied the discovery rule in an action based on an attorney's
negligence in certifying a real estate title.m In its ruling, the court compared
the attorney-client relationship to that of a doctor. 203 It held:
The attorney, like the doctor, is an expert .... The client is not
an expert; he cannot be expected to recognize professional negli-
gence if he sees it, and he should not be expected to watch over
the professional or to retain a second professional to do so. The
relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in its nature.?
These justifications for applying the discovery rule to the attorney-client
relationship apply with equal force to the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
Psychotherapy clients have little knowledge or expertise in the technical aspects
of psychotherapy. Even more so than clients seeking the aid of attorneys,
psychotherapy clients must rely on the advice and expertise of psychotherapists
for false representation when he caused a pregnancy in a client after he told her, "I can't possibly
get anyone pregnant." An attorney may be disciplined for violation of his fiduciary duty even
in the absence of an attorney-client relationship. See Worth v. State Bar of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 337,
551 P.2d 16, 18, 130 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (1976); Sodikoff v. State Bar of Cal., 14 Cal. 3d 422,
535 P.2d 331, 334-35, 121 Cal. Rptr. 467, 472 (1975); Lewis v. State Bar of Cal., 9 Cal. 3d 704,
511 P.2d 1173, 1178-79, 108 Cal. Rptr. 821, 826-27 (1973).
195. See Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1040 (La.
1987) ("[i]n all his relations with his clients, it is [an attorney's] duty to exercise and maintain
the utmost good faith, honesty, integrity, fairness, and fidelity"). See also Searcy v. Novo, 188
So. 490, 498-99 (La. Ct. App. 1939) ("relation of attorney and client ... 'superinduces' a trust
status of highest order; [it] devolves upon the attorney the duty of dealing with client only on
basis of strictest duty and honor").
196. Hendrickson, 310 N.E.2d at 135.
197. Id.
198. 778 P.2d 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
199. Id. at 19. See also Neel v. Magana, Oiney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176,
491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
200. See supra notes 193-99.
201. 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974).
202. Id., 310 N.E.2d at 132.
203. Id., 310 N.E.2d at 135.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
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because that trust is what makes the therapy work.m As a result, psycho-
therapy patients almost necessarily have a "low index of suspicion" for
negligent acts.205 They, like attorneys' clients, should not require another
expert to watch over the professional. And, like attorneys, therapists are
fiduciaries to their clients. 7 As the psychotherapy client is in a position the
same as or similar to that of the client of an attorney, the statute of limitations
should be equally interpreted to include the discovery doctrine in psychother-
apist negligence cases.
(2) Benefit Conferred on Fiduciary
Courts generally hold that attorneys who receive advantages from their
clients have the burden of proving that the transaction was free from coercion,
fraud, or undue influence and was entered into only after full and fair
disclosure." In Beery v. State Bar of California,2 the defendant attorney
contended that the loan he encouraged his client to make to a company in
which the attorney held a significant and undisclosed interest was "purely a
business matter. ' 210 The court held that the loan was "not an arm's length
business deal, material facts were concealed, and there is ample precedent for
imposing discipline." 211 The attorney concealed that he had an interest in the
company, which was sufficient to create liability in the attorney.
212
Goldman v. Kane 213 involved an attorney who arranged a $30,000 loan for
a client, secured by the attorney obtaining title to approximately $80,000
worth of the client's property. 24 The client defaulted on the loan, and the
attorney sold and seized the client's home and boat.25 The benefit to the
attorney was clear: "The fundamental unfairness of the transaction and the
egregious overreaching by [the attorney] in his dealings with [the client] are
self-evident. '21 6 The court held that "[ifn light of the nature of the transaction,
[the attorney], at a bare minimum, was under a duty not to proceed with
the loan until he was satisfied that [the client] had obtained independent
advice on the matter. '217 As the attorney had failed to do this, the court
ordered the attorney to repay the client.218
205. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
206. T. GuTnm & P. APPnLAtnm, CNicAL HANDBooK op PSYCmATRy & nm LAw 152-53
(1982).
207. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Beery v. State Bar of Cal., 43 Cal. 3d 802, 739 P.2d 1289, 1294, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 121, 126 (1987).
209. 43 Cal. 3d 802, 739 P.2d 1289, 239 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1987).
210. Id., 739 P.2d at 1293, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
211. Id., 739 P.2d at 1295, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
212. Id.
213. 329 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
214. Id. at 772 n.4.
215. Id. at 772.
216. Id. at 773.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 774.
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Ordinarily, the court determines when the statute of limitations has run by
determining when a reasonable person "ought to have known" of the cause
of action.2 9 Reasonable persons are expected to use "due diligence" in
obtaining knowledge as to their cause of action.? However, in the context
of attorney-client relationships, and when a benefit has been conferred to the
fiduciary, several courts have relaxed the "reasonable diligence" standard
because they find that clients are entitled to rely on the good faith of their
fiduciaries.Y'
In Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta Development Co. ,m
the Louisiana court held the plaintiffs to a lesser degree of diligence. The
court explained that it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on the attorney
to affirmatively disclose all conflicts of interest he might have in regard to
his representation of them.= The court commented that where suspicions are
raised and the fiduciary "quiets the suspicions," the plaintiffs are further
entitled to rely on the fiduciary's representations.2
Where the psychotherapist receives a benefit from the client, such as sexual
gratification, the same presumption should apply: the transaction should be
considered presumptively the result of undue influence.m The lessened degree
of diligence is particularly appropriate to the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship. In a psychotherapist-patient relationship, the patient is required to trust
in and rely upon the good faith of the therapist. Abuse of this trust, in the
form of advantage taken by the therapist, destroys the very purpose of
therapy.2 At the very least, clients should be able to rely upon the therapist
to do no harm and to affirmatively disclose any potential risks.m2 Often,
though, therapists will assure their clients that the therapy was proper. 8 In
these situations, like the situation present in Plaquemines Parish,2 the client
should be allowed to rely upon the representations of the fiduciary, and a
lesser degree of diligence should be required in discovering the wrong.
219. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1113, 751 P.2d 923, 928, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661
(1988).
220. See, e.g., id., 751 P.2d at 927, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
221. See Beery v. State Bar of Cal., 43 Cal. 3d 802, 739 P.2d 1289, 239 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1987);
Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034 (La. 1987); Barbara
A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). See also Hobbs v. Eichler,
164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 404 (1985) (court notes that in a fiduciary relationship,
facts "which ordinarily require investigation may not incite suspicion, and [thus] do not give rise
to a duty of inquiry"); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 786 (1991) (failure of
a psychotherapist to reveal facts relevant to a potential malpractice action will toll the statute of
limitations until the plaintiff discovers the cause of action).
222. 502 So. 2d 1034 (La. 1987).
223. Id. at 1059.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (1983).
226. See supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
227. See Beery v. State Bar of Cal., 43 Cal. 3d 802, 739 P.2d 1289, 239 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1987);
Plaquenines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034 (La. 1987).
228. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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The subtle nature of psychological damages further compels the application
of the "lessened degree of diligence" to psychotherapist-patient relationships.
The Federal District Court of Washington, D.C. confronted this issue in
Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc2 °0 The plaintiff had been emotionally damaged
by a psychological training program but was unable to causally link her injury
to the defendantsY' She had experienced "atypical behavior" during the
course of the training program but had been unable to recognize the cause
of it until she read a news article about the defendants. 22 The court said:
[Tihe fact that an individual develops psychological problems, even
severe ones, is not sufficient in itself to put a reasonable person
on notice that they have been injured. Far too many persons
undergo serious psychological suffering without legally compen-
sable injury to make it a reasonable expectation on the part of
the courts that the emergence of psychological problems should be
evaluated immediately in terms of injuryY73
As the Shamloo court discussed, it may be "unreasonable to expect a
person with psychological problems to identify one cause, injury or emotional
trauma as the reason for a prolonged disorder."'- The doctrine of "over-
determination" of psychological traits holds that all psychological disorders
are derived from more than one cause? 5 Many cases revolve around victims
who cannot understand the injury and its cause for years following the
maltreatment? 6 For example, in Riley v. Presnell,237 the defendant allegedly
introduced alcohol, marijuana, and Valium use into therapy sessions with his
male patient. 28 Also, on at least two occasions, Presnell persuaded his client
to engage in sexual activity with him, supposedly under the guise that this
activity was necessary for the patient to deal with his feelings toward his
father.? 9 Riley became extremely dependent upon his therapist, opining on
one occasion that Presnell could be "God."'m'1  After Presnell abruptly aban-
doned the plaintiff, Riley began experiencing severe emotional and psycho-
logical problems, as well as Valium, marijuana, and alcohol addictions.2 4
Although he began therapy with a new psychiatrist in 1980 to ease his Valium
addiction, Riley claimed that he did not know that his psychological problems
230. 713 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1989).
231. Id. at 16.
232. Id. at 18.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 18 (citing S. Fumr, Mourning and Melancholia, in PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 177
(P. Rieff trans. 1963)).
236. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Greenberg v. McCabe,
453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840
(1979).
237. 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780 (1991).
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were related to his therapy until 1984, when he met another former patient
of Dr. Presnell's who had been similarly abused.2 2 The court reversed sum-
mary judgment and remanded the statute of limitations issues to trial on the
ground that "there was evidence to support the conclusion that a reasonable
person who had been subjected to the type of abuse alleged by Riley would
have been unable to draw a causal connection between that improper therapy
and the psychological problems."4 3
In Simmons v. United States,2" the plaintiff was involved in a sexual
relationship with her therapist, an Indian Health Services employee.2 s Al-
though the relationship ended in 1980, Simmons did not learn that her
emotional problems were related to this exploitative relationship until February
of 1983.21 Prior to that time, the plaintiff had believed that the sexual
relationship was "her fault" and that she was a worthless person, "particularly
as a sexually bad person, someone who was sexually dirty or degraded, or
whorish."2 7
Simmons and Shamloo illustrate the practicality of applying relaxed delayed
discovery principles to psychotherapist-patient cases commensurate to the
relaxed principles applied to attorney-client cases, m while Riley reaches the
same result with slightly different reasoning.2 9 The similarity of the relation-
ships warrants application of the "lesser degree of diligence" standard in
both types of cases. In addition, an independent justification for applying
these principles lies in the nature of the injuries that victims of psychotherapist
abuse are reasonably likely to withstand35 The subtlety of psychological
242. Id., 565 N.E.2d at 784.
243. Id., 565 N.E.2d at 786.
244. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
245. Id. at 1364.
246. Id. Simmons suffered a variety of emotional problems that resulted in a hospitalization
in May 1982 and a suicide attempt in November 1982. In February 1983, her subsequent treating
therapist told her that her condition, identified as post-traumatic stress disorder, was caused by
her prior therapist's bad treatment. Id.
247. Id. at 1367.
248. Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1363; Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 14, 16-17 (D.D.C.
1989).
249. Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 786 (1991). Rather than specifically
relying on a "lessened degree of diligence," the Massachusetts court has redefined the discovery
rule. Id. Under this decision, the "reasonable man" who serves as the standard in psychological
injury cases
is not a detached outside observer.... Rather it is a reasonable person who has
been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis of the plaintiff's com-
plaint .... If such an initially reasonable person would, by reason of the experience
forming the basis for the plaintiff's complaint, have his or her judgment altered in
some way, such altered judgment then becomes the standard. The cause of action
will not accrue until such an individual would have discovered the damage.
Id. (emphasis added). The court explained that "[a]ccrual of the cause of action occurs when
the ordinary reasonable person who had been subject to the experience would have discovered
that the injury was caused by that experience." Id. By placing the reasonable person in the shoes
of an injured plaintiff, the diligence to investigate required is lessened to the extent that a
plaintiff's perception is impaired. Id.
250. See supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
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injuries and the variety of their causes create a compelling argument for the
application of the "lessened degree of diligence" standard to psychotherapist-
client malpractice cases.
c) Analogy to Incest
Most similar to psychotherapist-patient sexual misconduct cases are incest
cases. In deciding whether to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of
limitations in in cea;t cases, courts have distinguished between two types of
situations.21 In the first, the victim may have completely blocked the traumatic
events from conscious memory.252 In the second, memory of the events
themselves may not be repressed, but years may have elapsed before the
victim can recognize the wrongfulness of the acts.23 Victims of psychotherapist
sexual misconduct often experience either a complete repression of the trau-
matic events or an inability to recognize the wrongfulness of the acts.2 4 The
similarity between psychotherapist sexual misconduct and incest is so marked
that a discussion of the analogy and the courts' rulings concerning incest is
appropriate.
Incest ruptures the close, caretaking relationship that occurs between the
parent and child . It is an abuse of trust of the highest magnitude, and it
causes long-term injury to the personality.26 The actual sexual abuse of the
251. See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. IMI. 1988). For a general discussion
of incest and the discovery rule, see Hartnett, Use of the Massachusetts Discovery Rule by Adult
Survivors of Father-Daughter Incest, 24 Naw ENO. L. Rev. 1243 (1990).
252. See Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1990) (plaintiffs,
three brothers, "developed various 'psychological blocking mechanisms,' ... [t]hey were conse-
quently unable to perceive the psychological injuries caused them or their causal connection to
[the abuser's] acts"); Mary Doe v. John Doe, 216 Cal. App. 3d 285, 254 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1989)
(plaintiff had repressed all memory of childhood sexual abuse by father). See also Meiers-Post
v. Schafer, 170 Mich. App. 174, 427 N.W.2d.606 (1988) (plaintiff repressed memory of sexual
relationship with tea.her until memory revived by television program); Peterson v. Bruen, 106
Nev. 271, 792 P.2d 18, 23-24 (1990) (plaintiff "blocked from his memory the incidents involving
[his abuser]," who was his Big Brother in a Big Brother/Little Brother program). But cf. Tyson
v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) (holding that the discovery rule does not apply
to cases in which the plaintiff has repressed memory).
253. See Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989) ("the severe emotional trauma
experienced by [the plaintiff] resulted in her being unable to fully understand or discover her
cause of action during the applicable statutory limitations period"); Hammer v. Hammer, 142
Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987), review denied, 144 Wis. 2d 953, 428 N.W.2d 552 (1987)
("even if [the plaintiff] may have harbored some subjective doubts about the normalcy of [her
father's] actions, beause of [her father's] domination and authority and her own guilt, depression
and disassociation, she had no information to a reasonable probability of the nature of her
injuries or the facts wi t- respect to their cause"). But see DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App.
3d 1011, 242 Cal. :Rptr. 368 (1987) (where plaintiff was aware of the abuse but not the
consequences, the court held that the statutory period was not tolled).
254. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Ms. Simmons'
transference and dependence made it very difficult for her to believe that anything [her therapist]
had done caused her emotional damage; rather ... she blamed herself for her problems").
255. See, e.g., Hamwer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 953, 418 N.W.2d 23. "Victims of incest
have been harmed because of a 'most egregious violation of the parent/child relationship'." Id.,
418 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GoLDN GATE
U. L. Rev. 609, 631 (1983)).
256. Even though parents are usually not considered professional "fiduciaries" to their children,
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child is one aspect of the injuries resulting from incest.2 Another aspect is
the abuse of the dependency and innocence or naivete of the child to prevent
revelation of the abuseY8 This may be accomplished by instructing the child
that the sexual acts are normal or necessary to the relationship. The damage
to the incest victim flows from the wrong perpetrated, but the longer-lasting,
more devastating damage results from the destruction of the important rela-
tionship itself.259
The psychotherapist-patient relationship is parallel to the parent-child re-
lationship in both the structure of the relationship and the damages which
follow.= The structure is similar due in part to the extreme vulnerability that
many individuals carry into the psychotherapist-patient alliance and the power
imbalance and trust that is created as part of the therapeutic relationship.2'
Many times the psychotherapist becomes a benevolent parent figure to the
client.m Abuse of this position of power actually constitutes two wrongs, as
in incest. The first is that the therapist sexually abuses a dependent client.20
The second is that the therapist uses the dependency and innocence or naivete
of the client to prevent revelation of the abuse.2 This may be accomplished
by instructing the client that the sexual acts are normal or necessary to the
relationship, just as children are so taught in incestuous relationships.m
Deception leads clients to believe that their doubts concerning the sexual
relationship demonstrate their own inadequacies.m Likewise, future injuries
the courts do see parents as having a "confidential" relation toward them which affords children
a high degree of protection. See Evans v. Eckelman, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1608, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605,
608-09 (1990). For a discussion of the differences between confidential and fiduciary relationships,
see supra note 96.
257. See, e.g., Blake-White & Kline, Treating the Disossociative Process in Adult Victims of
Childhood Incest, 66 Soc. CAsEwoRK 394 (1985).
258. See, e.g., Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 953, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987), rev. denied,
144 Wis. 2d 953, 428 N.W.2d 552 (1987).
259. The parent-child relationship is also called a "status relationship." Frankel, supra note
46, at 798-99. A status relationship exists when "one party (the Power Bearer) ... has a partial
or full monopoly over the means for satisfying the needs of the other party (the Dependent)."
Id. at 798. See also, e.g., Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609
(1990).
260. G. Gabbard, Introduction, supra note 26, at xi; MwN. TAS FORCE, IT's NEvER O.K.:
PRoFssmoNAL HANDBooK, supra note 1, at 15-17. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Civ. Ct. 1975) ("in
essence [the plaintiff] alleges coercion by a person in a position of overpowering influence and
trust").
262. See, e.g., Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 854
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) ("the [therapist] 'became a God' to [the plaintiff]").
See also supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
263. See DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors, supra note 152, at 204.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Roy, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 298 ("during the course of [the plaintiff's] treatment and
in furtherance thereof, [the therapist] suggested that they have sexual relations as part of her
treatment"). See also G. ScHomER, PsYcaoTBHE rIss' SExuAL IVOLJvmENT wrrH CLiNrs,
supra note 1, at 75-77.
266. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986) (the plaintiff
believed that the sex that occurred was because she was "a very bad person, particularly ...
someone who was sexually dirty, degraded, or whorish").
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arising from the deception will probably also be attributed to personal short-
comings and not the therapist.67 These psychological syndromes may prevent
the child abuse victim or the psychotherapist abuse victim from discovering
the cause of their malaise.m The victim may either repress all memory of
the abuse or be unable to recognize the wrongfulness of the acts.
Several jurisdictiDns have applied the discovery rule in incest cases and
other sexual abuse cases involving repressed memory m For example, in Mary
Doe v. John Doe,:r' ° the plaintiff had repressed all memory of the acts of
incest by her father that occurred from the time she was an infant until she
was five years old. Only when she was in her twenties did an incident occur
which triggered her memory of the abuse, and she then filed suit.27' The
court held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts which, if true, would
make the discovery rule applicable and reversed the summary judgment of
the lower court.272 Specifically, the court found that because the plaintiff had
"repressed her contemporaneous awareness of the assaults against her [as a
child] and then later recovered those buried memories [as an adult] ... it
would be most unfair to the plaintiff not to toll the statute." 273
However, in a.other opinion, a California court has indicated that total
repression might not be necessary for the discovery rule to apply. In Evans
267. See, e.g., Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 785 (1991) (the plaintiff
stated, "I learned [through subsequent therapy] that [the defendant] was the root of my Valium
addiction, alcohol abuse and marijuana use").
268. See supra not,~s 26-45 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., lohnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. IUl. 1988) (federal court applied
Illinois discovery rule to incest case in which victim had repressed all memory of the events);
Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1608, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990) (application of discovery
rule in case involving three brothers, all having repressed memory of sexual abuse by their foster
father); Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 170 Mich. App. 174, 427 N.W.2d 606 (1988) (discovery rule
applied where high school teacher had sexual relations with the plaintiff but the plaintiff had
repressed all memory of the event until the plaintiff was 30 years old).
270. 216 Cal. App. 3d 285, 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1989).
271. Id., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 636. Mary Doe's story was profiled in a recent article in the New
York Times Magazine section. Mithers, Incest and the Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, § 6
(Magazine), at 44. Doe had been arrested for drunk driving and began attending Alcoholics
Anonymous:
Asked to write an inventory of her life as part of her A.A. experience, [Doe]
realized that she had no memories of her early childhood. "I thought maybe kids
just don't remember," she said in a recent interview, her voice low and shaky.
"But after I was sober, it was like walls crumbling in my head. Feelings started
coming back. I'd lie down, close my eyes and feel my body hurting. Sometimes if
I was driving I'd have to pull over."
In therapy, she began to rediscover her early childhood memories - and found
that she had repressed numerous instances of sexual abuse by her father. "On the
black couch - 4-5 years old, afternoon," she wrote as part of her therapy,
describik some of what she recalled. "He was on top of me.... I remember
searing, burning pain .... I didn't move, I didn't cry. I didn't feel. I had learned
to make miself dead on the inside. The life inside me was gone."
Id.
272. Id., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
273. Id., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
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v. Eckelman,74 the California Appeals Court held that a cause of action for
an adult survivor does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or should
discover the act of molestation and the wrongfulness of these acts.275 Although
Evans concerned an individual who had repressed all memory of the abuse
he suffered, the court specifically referenced survivors who did not repress
memory of the acts themselves: "Even where memory of the events themselves
is not suppressed, it may be some time before the victim can face the full
impact of the acts." 76 The court concluded that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the plaintiff understands or should understand
that the injury was caused by wrongdoing.m7
Other jurisdictions have also utilized the discovery rule in cases in which
memory of the acts of sexual abuse is not repressed.27 In a Wisconsin case,
Hammer v. Hammer,2 9 the plaintiff was sexually abused by her father from
ages five to fifteen.2 When she was fifteen, the plaintiff told her mother
about the abuse. 2 Both parents denied that the abuse had occurred and then
blamed the plaintiff for causing the family strife.? The plaintiff finally
brought suit when she reached the age of twenty-two.? In the appeal from
summary judgment, the court held that the delayed discovery rule applies as
a matter of law where a plaintiff does not know that abuse had caused
psychological injuries.m
Another jurisdiction has held that the discovery rule does not apply as a
matter of law to repressed-memory incest cases. In Tyson v. Tyson,s28 the
Washington Supreme Court accepted the argument that the expert testimony
needed to prove the occurrence of incest is tenuous.2w The court questioned
the ability of an expert witness to reconstruct past events with accuracy, as
is sometimes required in repressed-memory incest cases.w Its ruling appears
to limit incest cases and may be an impediment to successfully pursuing
274. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1990).
275. Id., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
276. Id.
277. Id., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
278. See, e.g., Osland v. Osland,'442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989) (while there was no allegation
that the plaintiff had repressed all memory, the plaintiff had been unable to discover the cause
of action within statutory period); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987),
review denied, 144 Wis. 2d 953, 428 N.W.2d 552 (1987) (plaintiff did not repress memory of
acts but did not know they caused damage until age 22).
279. 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987), review denied, 144 Wis.2d 953, 428 N.W.2d
552 (1987).
280. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 24.
281. Id.
282. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 24-25.
283. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 25.
284. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 26.
285. 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986). Tyson excluded cases in which the victim was
unable to recognize the wrongfulness of the acts as well. However, the Washington legislature
enacted a statute specifically including such cases within the ambit of the discovery rule. See
WAsH. REy. CODE ch. 144, S.S.B. No. 6305. WAsH. Ray. CODE § 4.16.350 (Supp. 1991).
286. Id., 727 P.2d at 229.
287. Id.
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psychotherapist misconduct cases involving repressed memory as well. The
court feared the encouragement of spurious or stale claims and the resulting
injustice.3 8 The court stated that given the "substantial risks of stale claims
in cases of this nature, we conclude that a literal reading of the statute of
limitations strikes the proper balance between the possibility of such claims
and the right to bring an action."'
A number of protections are recognized by the law which would insure
fairness to the defendant in incest and, by analogy, psychotherapist malprac-
tice cases. In a delayed discovery case, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
the reasonableness of their delayed discovery.2m Once a plaintiff has offered
facts, which if true are sufficient to apply the discovery rule, these facts must
be submitted to and determined by the trier of fact. The procedural devices
of cross-examination and counter-testimony of opposing experts should pro-
vide protections in cases of this type.29 In addition, psychiatric evidence is
admitted in a wide variety of cases, including personal injury, custody, and
even criminal trials. To label psychiatric evidence as presumptively incompetent
seems to be entirely contrary to established legal thought.
Tyson292 also highlights an important difference between incest cases and
cases involving psychotherapist sexual misconduct. With psychotherapist sex-
ual misconduct, the victim is nearly always an adult. The chances of total
repression of the mremory of the events is not as great with adults as with
children in incest cases. 29 This difference makes psychotherapist malpractice
cases more compelling than incest for application of the discovery rule in
cases in which the injury or its likely cause is not recognized within the
statutory period.
d) Summary
Psychotherapist malpractice is similar to other acts of negligence that by
their nature result in damages that remain obscure to the injured party.21
Harsh results often occur when the courts construe the statutes of limitations
as beginning at the time of injury. These results are especially common when
the negligence giving rise to the action takes place over a period of time
instead of at one discernible moment. 295 The "discovery" interpretation of
statutes of limitations mitigates these harsh results.
The discovery rule as applied to fiduciary relationships decreases the duty
of diligence required of plaintiffs.29 This rule provides that a plaintiffs cause
of action does not accrue until a reasonable plaintiff laboring under coercion,
288. Id., 727 P.2d at 230.
289. Id.
290. Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1608, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990).
291. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
292. 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).
293. E. Disch, supra note 41. See also G. SCHOENER, PSYCHOTRAPISTs' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT
wrrH CtEN-rs, supra note 1.
294. See supra notes 177-293 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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fraud, or undue influence knows or should know of the injury and its cause.29
Formulated in this manner, the rule still holds the parties to an objective
standard, making it appropriate as a rule of construction.
Psychotherapist malpractice cases lend themselves easily, by analogy to
attorney malpractice cases, to the application of the relaxed discovery rule.29
In jurisdictions which either have not adopted the discovery rule or have
abolished it, these types of cases may be brought through an equitable tolling
provision, such as fraudulent concealment of a cause of action.
C. Fraudulent Concealment and the Statute of Limitations
Historically, in cases of fraud, mistake, and breach of trust, courts have
allowed statutes of limitations to begin to run only after a plaintiff knows
or should know of the cause of action.29 Fraud concepts have been incor-
porated into the construction of modern statutes of limitations in nearly every
jurisdiction.3°° One common doctrine is "fraudulent concealment." This sec-
tion will describe fraudulent concealment and how it is particularly suited for
application to sexual misconduct cases.
1. Fraudulent Concealment Defined
Fraudulent concealment is defined as knowingly concealing or suppressing
a material fact which is intimately connected with the business in reference
to which the relation exists; this concealment must also be done with the
intent to mislead or defraud.3°0 The doctrine is applied when an injured party
does not know of the cause of action due to the wrongful conduct of the
defendant02° Many times the defendant's action works as an independent act
of fraud, concealing from the plaintiff a separate wrong over which the
plaintiff now seeks to bring suit.03 Fraudulent concealment operates in situa-
tions in which failure to toll the limitations period would be inherently unfair
or unreasonable. 0 Generally, the limitations period will be tolled until the
injured party learns or should have learned through reasonable diligence of
the wrong.3 05
Courts use this equitable principle to estop defendants from profiting from
their own wrongdoing. In Borderlon v. Peck,3°6 the Texas court eloquently
describes this public policy:
297. See supra notes 221-50 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 205-07, 225-50 and accompanying text.
299. Note, Statutes of Limitations, supra note 151, at 1213.
300. See Annotation, Limitations of Actions, supra note 154, § 147.
301. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 596 (5th ed. 1979). 0
302. See, e.g., Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Ham, 98 Nev. 311, 646 P.2d 1221, 1223-24 (1982).
303. See Annotation, Limitations of Actions, supra note 154, § 147.
304. See, e.g., Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 305 P.2d 20, 33 (1956) (citing
Bartlett v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 110 Cal. App. 2d 683, 244 P.2d 91, 98 (1946); Rose v. Dunk-
Harbison Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 502, 46 P.2d 242, 243 (1922); 2 WOOD ON LWATIONS 858-59
(4th ed. 1916)).
305. See, e.g., Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 ('rex. 1983).
306. 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983).
219
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Texas courts have long adhered to the view that fraud vitiates
whatever it touches, and have consistently held that a party will
not be permitted to avail himself of the protection of a limitations
statute when by his own fraud he has prevented the other party
from seeking redress within the period of limitations. To reward
a wrongdoer for his own fraudulent contrivance would make the
statute a means of encouraging rather than preventing fraud.3°7
In cases in which the parties deal at arm's length, the burden of proof is
on the injured party. The injured party must prove that the defendant engaged
in an affirmative act of concealment before the courts will exercise the
fraudulent concealment exception to the statute of limitations.ies
In cases involving fiduciary relationships, however, the courts are more
lenient in finding fraudulent concealment. Fiduciaries are required to disclose
all material facts connected with or affecting the purpose of the relationship.3°9
Failing to disclose any of these facts may, in and of itself, constitute fraudulent
concealment which will toll the statute of limitations °10 A fiduciary's breach
of any duty owed to the client may be the basis of a fraudulent concealment
tolling of the limitations period. Some jurisdictions require fiduciaries to
disclose their own negligence to the trusting party or the limitations period
will be tolled until the plaintiff has reason to discover the negligence.3 "
307. Id. at 908-09.
308. See, e.g., Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1945) ("[iln
general, to establish a cause of action for fraud or deceit plaintiff must prove that a material
representation was made; that it was false; that defendants knew it to be untrue or did not have
sufficient knowledge to warrant a belief that it was true; that it was made with an intent to
induce plaintiff to act in reliance thereon; that plaintiff reasonably believed it to be true; that it
was relied on by plaintiff; and that plaintiff suffered damage thereby").
309. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
310. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421,
429, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845 (1971) ("[in a fiduciary relationship] although the defendant makes
no active misrepresentation, this element 'is supplied by an affirmative obligation to make full
disclosure, and the non-disclosure itself is a "fraud' (citations omitted)); Plaquemines Parish
Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1059 (La. 1987); Toombs v. Daniels, 361
N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn. 1985) ("if a fiduciary duty existed the fiduciary could 'be liable for
fraudulent misrepresentation by silence even though there was no evidence of fraudulent statements
or of intentional concealment"'); Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. 1977).
311. See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 ('ex. 1983) ("[blecause the physician-patient
relationship is one of trust and confidence, Texas recognizes a duty on the part of a physician
to disclose a negligent Ect or fact that an injury occurred"). See also Golden Nugget, Inc. v.
Ham, 98 Nev. 311, 646 P.2d 1221, 1223-24 (1982) (court stated if a "fiduciary fails to fulfill his
obligations and also fails to inform the other party of his failure, [this results] in fraudulent
concealment"). See aso Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 659,
670-71 (1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit ten years after the death of her husband,
arguing that neither she nor the decedent discovered the doctor's alleged negligence until 1985
when she read an article concerning other malpractice cases pending against him. Id., 545 A.2d
at 671. See also Daw:ion, supra note 158, at 904-06. Today, however, many courts seem to hold
that the fraud exception will toll the statute of limitation where the physician knew of the alleged
negligence and concealed it, or if he knew of the negligence and failed to reveal it. Geisz, 545
A.2d at 671 (examining -3ixteen jurisdictions). Only one state applies constructive fraud tolling in
[Vol. 44:181
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Recognizing that overreaching may be exercised in fiduciary relationships,
the courts may not require plaintiffs to investigate the transactions they enter
into with their fiduciary.312 Even if facts indicating the fraudulent concealment
are available from a public record, knowledge of the fraud will not be
imputed until the plaintiff learns of the concealment, or has actual knowledge
of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person in the same position on inquiry
concerning the transaction.3 13 The courts, then, are less inclined to find that
an injured party "should have known" of a fiduciary's concealment before
gaining actual knowledge of the fiduciary's failure to disclose the facts.
314
The plaintiff is allowed to bring a claim within a "reasonable time" of
discovery. Many states, though, have statutes providing for the running of
the full limitations period after the finding of fraudulent concealment.
2. Application to Psychotherapist Misconduct
Based on the fiduciary relationship, several jurisdictions have employed the
fraudulent concealment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in cases in
which physicians have failed to disclose material facts about their treatment
of the plaintiff." 5 There appears to be no real distinction in this regard
between psychotherapists and physicians and their relations to their patients.
Failure to disclose any material fact which! results in harm to the patient
should trigger the fraudulent concealment doctrine as surely as it would for
any other fiduciary. 316 This particular duty may also give rise to the duty to
reveal any negligence by the fiduciary, as it was found to in Texas and
Nevada.317 Thus, the statute of limitations should also toll until victims of
psychotherapist malpractice know or have actual knowledge of facts which
would put them on inquiry.
In psychotherapist sexual misconduct cases, application of the fraudulent
concealment doctrine in fiduciary relationships has approximately the same
result as applying the discovery rule to a fiduciary relationship. In fraudulent
concealment cases, fiduciaries must know or have reason to know of the
cases in which the doctor fails to disclose that which he ought to have known, regardless of his
actual knowledge of the negligence. See Walter v. Rinker, 520 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
312. See Wills v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988) (the court stated that were it
not for the discovery rule, "[the client] would have to hire a second attorney to observe the
work of the first").
313. See Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d 113, 295 P.2d 113, 124 (1956) ("where there
is no prior duty to investigate [such as in confidential relationships] the statute does not run
until [the plaintiff] has notice or knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable [person] on
inquiry").
314. See, e.g., United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d
770, 776, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425 (1970).
315. See, e.g., Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983).
316. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Eichler, 164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 404 (1985)
(citations omitted) ("[w]here there is a duty to disclose, the disclosure must be full and complete,
and any material concealment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud").
317. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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negligence that they have failed to disclose."' Because sexual contact between
the patient and therapist is so clearly forbidden, in practice this requirement
will have no bearing in psychotherapist sexual misconduct cases.
319
In both fraudule:at concealment cases and discovery rule cases, if there is
a fiduciary relationship, there is an affirmative duty to disclose all material
facts relevant to the transaction. Failure of the fiduciary to disclose results
either in the relaxing of the discovery rules or the tolling of the statute of
limitations due to fraudulent concealment.
Delayed discovery doctrines provide relief for plaintiffs in jurisdictions that
allow for such rules; plaintiffs in other jurisdictions may rely upon the
equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Both doctrines are accessible
to victims of sexual exploitation by psychotherapists through the application
of fiduciary principles. It appears that in every jurisdiction, the courts have
carved out at least one exception to the statute of limitations, which victims
of sexual exploitation may take advantage of to raise the limitations bar. 32°
IV. Conclusion: A Paradigm for Judging
Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct
Fiduciary theory offers a clear and coherent model for judging psycho-
therapist sexual misconduct. Since the success of therapy depends upon the
degree of trust the patient is able to place in the therapist, the therapist's
violation of that trust is a fiduciary breach of the highest order. 32' The
damages caused to a victim's psyche and emotional development are extreme
and long-term.3 " The psychotherapist should be held to the most stringent
form of fiduciary responsibility. Several jurisdictions have already recognized
this.323
Statute of limitations determinations should be made in light of the ther-
apist's status as a fiduciary. The damage caused by sexualization of therapy
and the boundary violations associated with this negligence are unique in that
one of the injuries caused is an emotional paralysis or inability to confront
or recognize that abuse has occurred.3 2 As the injury arises directly out of
the "very business in reference to which the relation exists, ' '321 any advantages
318. Annotation, Limitations of Actions, supra note 154, § 148.
319. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (describing proscriptions on sexual contact
and resulting damages).
320. See Note, Medical Malpractice, supra note 163, at 401 n.22.
321. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1985) ("[defendant's
social work] license placed him in position of trust, the violation of which would constitute
breach of the fiduciary r.-lationship"); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 788
(1991) (there are fiduciary aspects to psychotherapist-patient relationship); Mazza v. Huffaker,
61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, 839 (1983) (psychotherapist abused position of "trust and
confidence"); Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
324. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
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derived by the fiduciary, including sexual self-satisfaction, should be closely
scrutinized by the courts.
Because clients are unable to come forward for years after the abuse, the
application of the discovery rule is warranted.32 Public policy favors the
extension of discovery to this circumstance, as the limitations period is
intended to run against those who fail to use diligence in enforcing their
rights, not those who are unable to discern their injury and its cause.27
This policy is recognized by the courts .32 The public interest is best protected
by allowing sexual misconduct cases to be brought through the application
of existing rules to these circumstances. Extending the discovery rule to
psychotherapist malpractice cases or applying an equitable tolling provision
such as fraudulent concealment to these cases is a logical way of addressing
this issue.
Further, it is against public policy to unjustly deprive one of his or her
remedy. 32 Failure to apply the discovery rule to psychotherapists in the same
manner as it is applied to other fiduciary relationships will deprive an entire
class of plaintiffs of a legal remedy.30 The relationship between therapist and
patient is of a confidential nature, the negligence that produces the injury is
of a type that is clearly known to be dangerous, and the risk can be guarded
against by the psychotherapist. 33' The burden of applying the discovery rule
to such an intimate, controlled relationship appears to be far less onerous
than the injustice that would result from barring relief to an entire class of
victims.
The discovery rule has been applied successfully in four cases of psycho-
therapist negligence.3 32 In Greenberg v. McCabe,333 the court found that the
victim's delayed knowledge of her cause of action could be based on three
factors .3  First, Greenberg was extremely dependent on McCabe, who kept
her from believing that his treatment caused her psychological harm.331 Second,
McCabe's repeated assurances that his treatment was proper kept her from
discovering her cause of action.336 Finally, because the therapy relationship
continued, it made it very unlikely that she would go elsewhere to discover
326. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 150-58, 177-78 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837-38 (1983); L.L.
v. Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455, 362 N.W.2d 174, 177-78 (1984).
329. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 189-250 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 52-74, 130 and accompanying text.
332. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986);
Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1989); Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239,
565 N.E.2d 780 (1991).
333. 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
840 (1979).
334. Id. at 771-72.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 772.
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the source of her affliction.337 The court held that "where the injury and
cause thereof are subtler and more complicated than in the normal malpractice
case, it seems particularly inappropriate to determine as a matter of law what
the plaintiff should have known." '
In Simmons v. United States,3 9 the court adopted the reasoning of Green-
berg.30 The court reasoned that the patient was so dependent on the therapist
that it was extremely difficult for her to believe that the therapist was the
cause of her daniage.3' Instead, she blamed herself for the damage.3 2 The
court upheld the findings of the lower court, emphasizing that "what she
knew and when she knew it are questions of fact."1
34
In Shamloo v. Lifespring, Inc.,3" the court held that the discovery rule
should apply to a. psychological organization's negligence.34 The court stated
that the causes of emotional and psychological injury are too subtle to
constructively hold a plaintiff to notice when she first begins expieriencing
"atypical behavior." 3" The assurances by the defendants upon which the
plaintiff relied further "serve[d] to bring her within the ambit of the discovery
rule."1
3
Finally, in Riley v. Presneil," the court held that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run against an injured patient until the patient knew or
should have known that he or she may have been injured as a result of the
psychotherapist's conductA"9 The standard to be used is that of a "reasonable
person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the
plaintiffs complaint, ' 13" the determination of which is left to the trier of fact
at time of trial.
3 1
These cases demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy of applying the discov-
ery rule to cases of psychotherapist sexual misconduct. The close analogy of
psychotherapist sexual misconduct to other situations in which discovery has
long been recognized to apply further justifies its use in sexual abuse cases.3 12
In jurisdictions where the discovery rule has been abolished, fraudulent
concealment provides a possible remedy for victims of emotional trauma
caused by sexual abuse.
3 3
337. Id.
338. Id. (footnote omitted).
339. 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
340. Id. at 1367-68 (quoting Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd,
594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979)).
341. Id. at 1367.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1368.
344. 713 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
345. Id. at 19.
346. Id. at 18.
347. Id.
348. 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780 (1991).
349. Id. 565 N.E.2d at 784-85.
350. Id. 565 N.E.2d at 785-86.
351. Id., 565 N.E.2d at 787.
352. See supra note; 115-298 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 299-320 and accompanying text.
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The standard of care required is higher in both discovery rule and fraudulent
concealment cases when there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties.
3-"
Jurisdictions have recognized the fiduciary aspects of the psychotherapist-
patient relationship. 3 5 Thus, fiduciary theory provides a logically consistent,
coherent paradigm from which to view psychotherapist sexual misconduct. It
serves to protect patients from the perversion of justice that would often
occur if the statute of limitations were strictly applied.
354. See supra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 205-07, 225-50 and accompanying text.
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